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The Sale-of-Control Premium-Bribe:
Recoupment In Advance:
A Case Study
DAVID COWAN BAYNE,

S.J.*

The illegal sale of corporate control has continued unabated over the decades. As early as 1969 Father Bayne
uncovered an esoteric variant on the bald bribery into
corporate control. The would-be contr6leur, instead of
using his own premium-bribe dollars, simply loots the
target-company treasury and uses the victim's cash to
premium-bribe the incumbent out of office. "Often,
however, the new [contr6leur] avoids the circuity of a
personal [premium-bribe] payment and later corporate
recoupment by an immediate raidon the corporatetill."**
Now, some nineteen years after these words, Father
Bayne presents his theoretical analysis applied in a dramatic account*** of a slightly recondite-butpredictably
popular-form of sale-of-controlpremium-bribery.
This legal study should be valuable to client and counsel
facing a sale of control or preparingfor litigation, and
to scholar and commentator as well.
-The Editors

Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
** Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 MINN. L. REV.
485, 502 (1969). The distillate of twenty-five years of research and writing in corporate
control recently appeared in treatise form in D. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL (1986).
*** This article was written as Plaintiff's Brief in a state/federal litigationbut with this publication as the joint purpose and motivation-and is reproduced
verbatim in its original format as an aid to the practitioner. Material in brackets are
editorial additions which did not appear in the Brief filed by Father Bayne. The case
was concluded with the final court approval of settlement in Wiener v. Roth, 791
F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1986), and regrettably never reached the merits. The Brief,
addressing the merits, is entitled: Bribery in a Corporate Guise: Roth, Noble and the
Statesmen Group, and can be found in the pleadings in the federal case. This is the
fourth Brief by Father Bayne that has been published as a lead article.
*
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For the avoydinge of corrup~on . . . be it therefore
enacted by the Kinge . . . that yf any person . . . bargayne
or sell any office . . . everie suche person . . . shall
ymediatlye . . . be adjudged a disabled person in the
lawe. . . . [E]verie suche bargaynes shalbe voide .....
-An Acte againste Buyinge and Sellinge of Offices,
1551, 5 Edward 6, ch. 16.
It shall be unlawful for any . . . officer . . . of a private
corporation . . . in any business transaction, to receive,
for his own use, directly or indirectly, any . . . bonus...
connected with . . . such business transaction ....
-Act of April 5, 1907, ch. 183, § 1, 1907 Iowa Laws
183.
Bribery has always been a crime, from Edward in England in
the 1500s and before, to Iowa in the present. And across the nation.
As the years passed, moreover, the crass bribe of the hoodlum
became a sophisticated complexity, and moved imperceptibly even
into the corporate boardroom. To this subtle invasion the criminal
codes of jurisdiction after jurisdiction responded with an equally
sophisticated, highly specialized crime: Commercial Bribery. Since
1907 Iowa has imposed a fine and imprisonment for plain old
bribery, now decked out in corporate guise.
Then in 1979 came the landmark Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual
Insurance Co., 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa). To the crime of Commercial Bribery was joined formally and expectably the common-law
tort: The Illegal Sale of Corporate Control.
Le Mars and Corporate Bribery
A trustee may not make use of his relations as such for
personal emolument. An agreement for a valuable consideration to abandon the trust or to transfer it to another
is void.
-Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 320, 114 N.W.
1047, 1049 (1908).
Although plaintiffs advance other theories . . . we depend, as did the trial court, on the illegal sale of control
to set aside the transaction.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
650 (Iowa 1979).
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As Aughey v. Windrem proclaimed in the year 1908, the sale
of office has always been illegal as against public policy. The
appointment of a successor for third-party dollars by a trustee who
is already amply remunerated has universally been deemed a breach
of trust. But, again expectably, the sophisticated corporate mind
entered the scene and camouflaged the garden variety bribery of
the days of Aughey with convoluted corporate machinations involving stock sales, hidden premium-bribes, compliant directors,
complex corporate maneuverings. And so it finally took Le Mars
in 1979 to strip away the corporate complexities and reveal the
simple primitive bribery of Aughey, standing stark and alone, shed
of its corporate clothes.
Today, therefore, the circuit is complete. The old-fashioned
crime of bribery has become Commercial Bribery as applied specifically to the corporate context, and the old-fashioned common-law
tort outlawing the sale of office has become The Illegal Sale of
Corporate Control. Today the incumbent contr6leur of a corporation may no longer-as in the past-accept with impunity illicit
premium-bribe dollars for the appointment of his successor to the
office of control, especially when that appointment is encompassed
in the very duty for which he has already been adequately compensated in corporate salary and perquisites. Le Mars has indeed
updated Iowa. To the minute. And been a clarion to the nation.
For many years prior to 1970, old John Alesch had been in
complete and unfettered control of the Le Mars Mutual Insurance
Company of northwest Iowa. This Alesch control over Le Mars
was unassailable on both fronts: (1) The Directors: All were in his
pocket. He nominated them all. He hired and fired the officer
directors. (2) The Annual Meeting: All the proxies were always
dutifully and unthinkingly voted for the Alesch directoral slate,
year after year. But such sheepishness is the rule of the day in the
widely held American corporation. With thousands of shareholders
scattered across the land, the control of the proxy-solicitation
mechanism is the guaranteed control of the board and, hence, the
corporation. Mere-incumbency control is virtually unassailable. Le
Mars was not at all unusual.
But in the late sixties, John Alesch was getting old and he knew
that it was time to appoint a new contr6leur-that ultimate person
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with final authority over the entity-to take over the helm. Old John
also knew full well that the principal duty of his office-for which he
received a full-time salary-was to install a suitable successor to chart
the future of Le Mars.
But John Alesch turned from duty to temptation. The tempter?
The Iowa Mutual Insurance Company of De Witt. The expansionist
Iowa Mutual had long hoped to gobble up the smaller Le Mars. But
latterly it had learned that rival Employers Mutual of Des Moines
had suggested a fairly substantial premium-bribe to induce Alesch to
hand over Le Mars to Employers. Inspired by this competition, Iowa
Mutual countered with a competing premium-bribe of its own: $300,000
under the table.
The rest was history. John Alesch yielded to the temptation.
Iowa Mutual paid over the $300,000 premium-bribe. The Le Mars
board dutifully resigned en masse-all were docile to the end-in
favor of equally docile Iowa Mutual minions. Predictably and inevitably, gucceeding annual meetings of Le Mars saw the sheepish proxies
rubber-stamp the Iowa Mutual nominees. Thus ended the illegal sale
of control of Le Mars by John Alesch to Iowa Mutual.
Fortunately for legal history and the hapless Le Mars owners,
the Supreme Court in 1979 "would not permit the sale of control.
Mr. Alesch could not profit from the transaction . . . ." (Rowen v.
Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d at 649.) The Court was unanimous and categorical in its condemnation:
[Tihose holding fiduciary positions must act with a high
degree of fidelity ....
In Aughey, 137 Iowa 320 [in 1908 this Court said:]
'. . An agreement for a valuable consideration to
abandon the trust or to transfer it to another is void.
He may voluntarily resign for reasons not mercenary
in character, but has no right to traffic in or make
merchandise of the confidence reposed in him.
The sale of control ...has been declared to be violative
of public policy, for the "management of a corporation is
not the subject of trade ....
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
650 (Iowa 1979) [(quoting In re Caplan's Petition, 20
A.D.2d 301, 303, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915, aff'd mem.
14 N.Y.2d 679, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877, 198 N.E.2d 908
(1964))].
Thus stripped of its complexities, The Illegal Sale of Control is
really quite simple: (1) The payment of a $300,000 premium-bribe,

SALE-OF-CONTROL PREMIUM-BRIBE

1988:91

(2) To John Alesch the incumbent contr6leur of Le Mars, (3) By Iowa
Mutual the would-be contr6leur, (4) To induce the appointment to
the office of control, (5) With scienter. These were the five requisites
of Le Mars.

And the sanctions imposed by the Supreme Court were equally
simple. John Alesch, for the breach of his fiduciary duty to Le Mars,
must disgorge the entire $300,000 premium-bribe to Le Mars, the
injured company. The patent consequence: Iowa Mutual, the guilty
premium-briber, forfeited its $300,000. Forevermore. And of course
Iowa Mutual was ousted from control.
LE MARS MUTUAL

Office of
IOWA

Contr6leur

JOHN

Enter The Statesman Group, Inc.
Edward Roth, 56, chairman and chief executive officer, is
Roth said the transaction, in his
leaving the firm .....
opinion, "was mutually compatible and should result in an
orderly transition and benefit the company and its stockholders.
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The announcement said D.J. Noble, president and chief
operating officer, likely will become chief executive officer.
-Statesman's Chief Executive . .. Leaves Firm, Des
Moines Register, Aug. 13, 1982, at 5B, col. 1.
Again fortunately for the law-and Statesman Group-the parallel with LeMars is pat. For all the years prior to September 3, 1982
Edward W. Roth was the uncontested contr6leur of Statesman Group.
But Mr. Edward Roth was "very much a family man and has other
business interests," as Mr.Noble explained the shift in control to the
Wall Street Journal (Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col. 5). And so, as did old
John Alesch before him, Mr. Roth bethought himself of a possible
premium-bribe, and began to shop around. The first response to
Mr.Roth by an aspirant successor had twin effects, both understandable: The proffered premium-bribe (1) proved grossly insufficient in
the Roth eyes and (2) immediately alerted David J.Noble-long-time
Number Two at Statesman-to the disastrous effects of a sale of
control of Statesman to an alien and unsympathetic third party.
Galvanized by the thought of walking the streets, the desperate
Mr.Noble was inspired-as Iowa Mutual before him had been inspired-to counteroffer a premium-bribe-and a substantial one indeed of $6.8 million-to induce Roth to appoint him, Noble, his
successor contr6leur.
And so it was. As with Le Mars, so with Statesman Group: (1)
A $6.8-million premium-bribe passed (2) To the incumbent contr6leur
Roth (3) From the would-be contr6leur Noble (4) To induce the
appointment to the office of control (5) Made knowingly. Again all
five requisites of Le Mars. The only difference: The $6.8 million
dwarfed the $300,000. But then Statesman was a much bigger plum.
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The Outline of This Brief
[11n dealing with Iowa Mutual ... Mr. Alesch held out
control of Le Mars as bait. His ability to deliver such
control was a condition of the sale. Completion of the
transaction, including payment to Alesch, . . . awaited the
resignation of Le Mars' directors and election of new ones
designated by Iowa Mutual, a maneuver Mr. Alesch easily
accomplished with no murmur of protest.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
649 (Iowa 1979).
The summary thesis of this Brief: That Statesman Group conforms irf all particulars to The Illegal Sale of Control reprobated in
Le Mars and hence warrants the same sanctions of Le Mars, will be
proven in four stages: I. The Statesman Story, II. The Sale-of-Control
Illegality, III. The Embezzlement, IV. The Remedy, and a Conclusion.
L

The Statesman Story

All who conspired or cooperated with John H. Alesch to
accomplish the illegal sale of control over Le Mars Mutual
are equally liable with him.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
651 (Iowa 1979).
In all essentials, the Statesman story was the Le Mars story all
over again. But with just enough accidental variations to give the
story its own peculiar personality and character. As the drama unfolds, therefore, and the dramatis personae walk across the stage,
think of Le Mars in essence but note the peculiar nuances of Statesman.
The plot of The Statesman Story unfolds in six chapters: (1) The
Rise of Roth, (2) The Roth Control Structure, (3) The Alien PremiumBribe, (4) The Noble Counteroffer, (5) The Noble Embezzlement, (6)
The Passing of the Premium-Bribe.
(1) The Rise of Roth
For many years Le Mars Mutual was a successful
mutual insurance company, operating principally in northwest Iowa. John H. Alesch, one of its directors, was the
most influential single person in the management of its
affairs and in determining its day-to-day policy.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
648 (Iowa 1979).
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Edward W. Roth-the principal 'devil in the piece'-was a smalltown Dakota boy who graduated from a Dakota Teachers College
and early in his business life became an insurance agent. By the year
1971 Roth, now a maturing 44, was able to combine his insuranceagency interests with a small Alabama life company to form what
was to become the Statesman Life Insurance Company. On this fragile
foundation, by the deft use of mergers, consolidations, power playsand the astute counsel of David J. Noble, his soon-to-be subalternEdward W. Roth was able to construct, building block by building
block, a modestly impressive empire: The Statesman Group, Inc.
Roth

Roth

The Statesman Group

Roth

Roth

Agency
Interests

i

Statesmn
Life
In .C .

American Life & Casualty
Ins. Co.

t

1973
]Ins.
Co.

Statesman
Life

Inc.,ca
the. cetepic
isf ofca
TheeStatsma

1976
Ins. Co.

Lf

Story

The Statesman Group, Inc....

include[s] three

stock and two mutual property-casualty companies, four

life-health carriers, two reciprocal exchanges and

...

vestment, premium financing and underwriting activities.

in-

-Best's Insurance Reports: Property-Casualty 1896
(1982).

By the crucial date of September 3, 1982, the Statesman empire

had spread across more than 39 states, had amassed assets in excess
of $260 million. The four-million-plus shares of Statesman were overthe-counter, with prices and trades carried on NASDAQ terminals
nationally, and were widely held by over 4,800 little shareholders
scattered across the United States. The network of 16 subsidiaries and
affiliates was headquartered in Des Moines with principal outposts in
Indiana, Alabama and the Dakotas. Statesman has 1,400 employees.
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But for present purposes the crucial consideration is the impregnable unity of the empire. Each of six insurance subsidiaries of The
Statesman Group, Inc. was either wholly owned by Statesman or close
to it. (One minor exception: Statesman Insurance Company, of which
Statesman Group owns only 56 percent.) The noninsurance firms were
all wholly owned.
THE STATESMAN GROUP, INC.
Automobile Underwriters Corp.

American Life & Casualty Ins. Co.
Vulcan Life Ins.

State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters]

Co.

Automobile Underwriters, Inc.

jState Automobile Insurance Association

Statesman Insurance Co].
tatesman Financial Services,

Inc.

I
Chares L. Howard, Inc. (A ency)

R. G. Dickinson_ Co.
Dickinson Properties, Inc.

Qualit

Control Cor . (Claims)

Techno Co. (Data ProcessinE)
-

ITimeco, Inc.

(Premium Financing)

]

In the end, then, the Statesman empire is in truth a single,
indivisible entity, owned, it is true, by 4,800 widely dispersed shareholders but nonetheless in the untrammeled control of Edward W.
Roth.
(2) The Roth Control Structure
Alesch owed Le Mars complete loyalty, honesty, and
His virtual dictatorship over the affairs of
good faith ....
Le' Mars heightened his duty to give it loyal and faithful
service.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
649 (Iowa 1979) (citations omitted).
Edward Roth had a keen sense of the control mechanics of the
widely held corporation. He understood vividly the two basic facts of
corporate life: (1)That the proxy-solicitation mechanism-naming directoral nominees, drafting the proxy, the mailing-is the infallible
key to the uncontested election of the directorate. (2) That personal
domination of the incumbent board-through financial leverage, social enticements or outright extortion-completes the vicious circle.
This domination gives the contr6leur dictatorial sway over the very
proxy solicitation that automatically elects the successor board. This
interreacting twin control is virtually unbeatable.
Over the many years, beginning with the first merger in 1971
which produced the incipient Statesman Group, Edward W. Roth,
contr6leur, maneuvered deftly with each succeeding acquisition to
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assure himself with certainty of these twin essentials to an invulnerable
control structure: (1) Unchallenged manipulation of the proxy solicitation for the annual meeting, and (2) Personal domination of the
incumbent directors.
The Roth Control of the Annual Meeting
In December, 1971 control . .. of the company [Statesman Life] was obtained by chairman of the board and
former president Edward W. Roth . . . . With the change
in control, management was completely revised ....
-Best's Insurance Reports: Life-Health 1942 (1982).
The Statesman Group, thus assembled, became the perfect paradigm of the widely held corporation: Defenseless and voiceless. The
annual meeting of Statesman was a charade.
The use of the shareholders list, the composition and wording of
the proxy statement, the printing, stamping and mailing of the proxy,
all were orchestrated by Edward W. Roth. No other single shareholder
owned over one percent of the common. Unorganized, with no
independent information about company affairs, limited only to the
Roth proxy statement, the 4,800 sheepish shareholders had no other
choice than to rubber-stamp Mr. Roth's hand-picked slate of directors.
And so it went, year in and out, for every year of the Roth elevenyear incumbency.
Two further factors buttressed the Roth position. For the years
immediately prior to September 3, 1982 Mr. Roth and family owned
a small but helpful 12-percent block of Statesman. To this was joined
another obedient 37 percent held by the trustee of the Statesman
Employees' Stock Ownership Plan. Both blocks invariably voted for
Roth, every year without fail.
Mr. Roth, therefore, had no concern about the annual meeting.
This left only the second requisite for the total success of the Roth
Control Structure.
The Kept Board
Le Mars is the real complaining party, the one victimized by the wrong. It had a right to expect its directors to
be more vigilant in protecting it ....
We find these directors
failed to discharge their duties as directors when even the
most ordinary diligence on their part would have prevented
the surrender of their corporation to Iowa Mutual.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639, 653-54
(Iowa 1979).
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In the case of each of the six directors-Roth was the chairman
of the seven-man board-Roth invariably saw to it that every one, to
a man, was variously but inextricably beholden to Roth. A dignified
bondage. Stated more exactly, the loyalty of every director was
unswervingly directed to dollars, prestige, social standing, or elemental
livelihood. And Roth had a taut string on the dollars, the prestige,
the standing, the fees or the salaries. The result invariably was
unanimous directoral approval of any directors, old or new, nominated by Roth. With the consequent domination of the annual proxy
statement for the annual meeting, the rest was perfunctory.
A cursory review of the frailty of each board member fleshes out
the Roth Control Structure:
George D. O'Neill, 56: In O'Neill, Roth had the perfect pawn.
A prototypal Eastern investment banker. Harvard College. A trustee
of Vassar and the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation. Home in Oyster
Bay. Office in Rockefeller Center (and a director of the Center to
boot). For over eleven years O'Neill had counselled Statesman on the
disposition of its extensive portfolio-mortgages, bonds, equitiesreaching a value over $132 million. The annual fees and commissions
flowing to O'Neill would alone excite sufficient loyalty to Roth to
produce instant obeisance. Add to this the distance to New York City
and a palpable lack of interest in Statesman-O'Neill missed more
meetings by far than any other director-and O'Neill became the ideal
Roth sycophant.
Simon W. Casady, 68: United Central Bank has long been
Statesman's primary banker. Simon Casady is Chairman of the Executive Committee of UCB. Thus Casady, Statesman director, places
Statesman's business with UCB. Of which Casady is a director. And
Casady, UCB director, approves the loans to Statesman. Of which
Casady is a director. Add to this conflict of interest the bolstering
presence of Edward W. Roth seated next to Casady on both boards.
This double interlock made mutual backscratching a simple matter.
But more to the present point, if Simon Casady wanted a steady flow
of Statesman banking, he had best make sure that he did the Roth
bidding or he would be off the Statesman board and a new bank
would be ensconced. And that was exactly the formula over the years.
Casady got the business. And Roth got constant compliance.
J. P. Ashton, 73: The subservience of Ashton was far more
straightforward. Ashton had retired from his little real-estate business.
Beyond his retirement income, his major source of funds was a
salaried sinecure with American Life, a major Statesman subsidiary.
This steady income, plus the prestige of the positions, kept J. P.
Ashton safely in the Roth camp.
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David J. Noble, 51: In 1975 Roth hired Noble away from General
United Group and installed him in various management jobs throughout the Statesman empire. Noble was undoubtedly more dependent
on Roth than was any other board member. His was a substantial
salary as the head operating officer of Statesman. He enjoyed directoral fees from all six major subsidiaries. In a word, if David J.
Noble were ever to cross swords with Roth he would find himself
unemployed, and in a correspondingly parlous financial position.
W. 0. Conyers, 52: As with Ashton, Conyers enjoyed the prestige
of the Statesman board, the annual stipend and the additional income
of the Advisory Committee of a Statesman subsidiary.
H. E. Clendenen, 59: As with Noble, Clendenen owed his total
livelihood to the pleasure of Roth. He had been a middle-management
employee for the entire Roth tenure. He held moderately lucrative
positions-vice-president, secretary, director-in six different Statesman subsidiaries. Clendenen ranked with Noble as the epitome of
Roth dependence.

The personal domination of these six was the focal point of the
Roth Control Structure. This ability to dictate to the incumbent board
gave Roth the unchallenged domination of the proxy-solicitation
mechanism. The result was a self-perpetuating incumbency. By controlling the incumbent board, Roth was able to ensure the election of
the succeeding board at each successive annual meeting.
This was the soothing tranquility which Edward W. Roth enjoyed
in the years prior to that key date, September 3, 1982.
(3)

The Alien Premium-Bribe

"It is established beyond question under New York law
that it is illegal to sell corporate office or management
control ....
The rationale of the rule is undisputable:
persons enjoying management control hold it on behalf of
the corporation's stockholders, and therefore may not regard it as their own personal property to dispose of as they
wish."
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
651 (Iowa 1979) (quoting Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates,
305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962)).
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But the idyll was about to end. In the early months of 1982,
storm clouds-at least for long-time Number Two, David J. Noblebegan to lower over Statesman. An insurance syndicate headed by a
group whose names need not now be named had for some years been
casting covetous eyes on The Statesman Group. Now in mid-1982 the
syndicate made its move, and approached Edward W. Roth, contr6leur, with a proposal for a Statesman takeover. (Shades of the
Employers Mutual overture to John Alesch prior to his sell-out of Le
Mars to Iowa Mutual.)
The syndicate proposal was simplicity itself: For a price to be
negotiated-say $5 million-Edward W. Roth was to turn over control
of Statesman by the tried-and-true device of the seriatim resignation
of the board. The implementation of the plan could be effected in a
matter of weeks. The weakest member of the board-perhaps H. E.
Clendenen, aged 59, with middle-management vulnerability-could be
forthwith replaced by a syndicate nominee. The mere threat of lost
salaries would produce an immediate resignation from the board. J.
P. Ashton would undoubtedly be next, followed by Willard 0.
Conyers, and, lo, the syndicate would have displaced the 'former'
board 4-3, should any questions arise. Under such a procedure the
final housecleaning, should one be necessary, could await the annual
meeting when Roth and the three syndicate nominees could propose
successfully an all-new directoral slate, named of course by the
syndicate. Such would be the sale of control.
This was the temptation that faced Edward W. Roth, just as it
had faced old John Alesch in Le Mars. The question: Should Mr.
Roth yield, as John Alesch had yielded, and hand over control of
Statesman for a $5-million premium-bribe?

(4) The Noble Counteroffer
All parties agree that directorships in a corporation are
not for sale and that a contract for that purpose is illegal
and unenforceable.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
659 (Iowa 1979).
When the word of this impending cataclysm reached him, Noble
was frantic. He, among all, had the most to lose. He was young, 51.
He had long been Number Two, and had long had his eyes on the
office of control. With an alien and unsympathetic group in controland insurance men to boot-his job was definitely in jeopardy, to say
nothing of his many directorships and lesser offices. What to do?
Perhaps, he thought, he could take a leaf out of Iowa Mutual's
book. Recall that Employers Mutual had been about to steal the prize
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with a tempting premium-bribe to John Alesch for control of Le
Mars. Remember, too, that John Alesch was commendably impartial.
He cared not a whit whence premium-bribe dollars, as long as they
reached his pocket.
And the thought was the father of the deed. Convinced that
Edward W. Roth possessed the same commendable impartiality, David
J. Noble approached Mr. Roth-as Iowa Mutual had approached
John Alesch-with a counteroffer, a substantial premium-bribe in the
amount of $6.8 million. Since Mr. Roth was in fact impartial, and
since the $6.8 million was sufficiently more substantial than the
syndicate's $5-million offer, the deal was sealed. Roth committed
himself to hand over the board to Noble. Noble committed himself
to pass the requisite $6.8 million. The parallel with Le Mars was
perfect, even down to the alien offer and the counteroffer. All that
remained: The resignation of Roth and the succession of Noble and
his minions.
But hold, all was not yet sunny and bright. Storm clouds still
lowered over David J. Noble. In fact, his problems were just beginning, the sealed deal notwithstanding. Poor David J. Noble did not
have the Iowa Mutual treasury at his disposal. When Iowa Mutual
had decided that it would premium-bribe John Alesch, all it did-as
most respectable premium-bribers usually do-was reach into its own
pocket, take out its own premium-bribe dollars, and hand them over
to old John Alesch. But how could David J. Noble, with only
minimum dollars in his pocket, ever think of producing the Rothmandated $6.8 million? Here was an absolutely excruciating predicament. Noble neared the dream of his career at last. Roth had agreed
to resign, to hand over Statesman to Noble. Noble had agreed to pass
the dollars. With just one last step, the sale of control would be
achieved. But the horrible truth remained: David J. Noble was, for
all practical purposes, penniless. Far from $6.8 million.
(5)

The Noble Embezzlement

We have already pointed out [that] all who assist or
cooperate in the breach of fiduciary duties-whether directors or not-are liable for the resulting damage.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
654 (Iowa 1979).
Only one major obstacle blocked the Noble path: Whence the
$6.8 million? Noble knew that Roth had a 'foolproof' offer from the
syndicate. He also knew that Roth was 'impartial,' and would yield
to the highest premium-briber. From Roth's standpoint, therefore,
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Noble's counteroffer must be impeccable and leave Roth risk-free, or
at least as free of risk as he would be were he to deal with the
syndicate. Now what?
Noble had studied Le Mars assiduously. He knew that premiumbriber Iowa Mutual used its own dollars from its own treasury, passed
them to premium-bribed John Alesch, and actually did get control of
Le Mars. But he also recalled, even more vividly, that Iowa Mutual
and John Alesch got caught. That the Supreme Court forced John
Alesch to disgorge every penny of the $300,000 premium-bribe over
to Le Mars. And that of course-more to the point for Noble-Iowa
Mutual consequently forfeited every penny of its $300,000 premiumbribe. These were sobering thoughts for David J. Noble. Failed
premium-bribery could hurt.
Noble also remembered another facet to the Iowa Mutual premium-bribery. Although Iowa Mutual actually used-and hence actually lost-its own premium-bribe dollars, Iowa Mutual had never
planned to be out of pocket, forevermore, those $300,000. From the
outset, later looting of Le Mars would recoup the outlay. (Foolishly,
these looting thoughts were even reduced to writing in the ill-starred
'Recoupment Letter' that was Iowa Mutual's eventual downfall.)
This thought of later looting had great appeal to Mr. Noble. But
one needs time for looting, and Edward W. Roth wanted his $6.8
million immediately. But, nonetheless, this 'recoupment' tactic fascinated David J. Noble. Could not some variant of the Iowa Mutual
scenario-first payment with one's own dollars and later recoupment
by looting-achieve the same result? But a variant that would still
put the $6.8 million into Noble's hands immediately, since later looting
was just too long for Roth to wait?
The Solution: Embezzle Now!
The most damaging single bit of evidence ... is the hotly
disputed "recoupment" letter ....
... Thus Le Mars, not Iowa Mutual, would really be
paying [the premium-bribe].
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
656 (Iowa 1979).
Would that David J. Noble had been wealthy. Then he could
have used his own dollars for the premium-bribe. Or, were his mother
rich, perhaps that would have been the solution. Willie Sutton would
simply have robbed his friendly neighborhood bank and paid the $6.8
million directly over to Roth. But that, obviously, would be messy.
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So in the end, David J. Noble, penniless, decided to reverse the
Iowa Mutual procedure and skip the two-step process altogether. He
would simply embezzle immediately, forego the circuitous route of
Iowa Mutual and use Statesman money now. The result would be the
same: "Thus [Statesman], not [Noble], would really be paying" the
premium-bribe, as the Supreme Court put it.
Nonetheless Noble went in with his eyes open. He was painfully
aware that Iowa Mutual got caught looting. He knew that John
Alesch had to disgorge the $300,000 premium-bribe to Le Mars. That
Iowa Mutual also had to restore the looted $300,000 to Le Mars. But
Noble was desperate. Roth demanded and Noble promised $6.8
million. But Noble was penniless. All the conjectures in the world
were otiose. Only one path lay open: Loot Statesman now. But how?
Again Mr. Noble seemed blocked at the pass. Statesman simply
did not have $6.8 million in lootable cash. A much more devious
device would have to be devised.
The Solution: The Bank Loan
We agree with the trial court that punitive damages are
proper against the ... individual defendants. Each was
guilty of violating his fiduciary duty or of cooperating with
those who did. Their conduct was deliberately designed to
wrongfully obtain control of Le Mars.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
662 (Iowa 1979).
Mr. Noble reasoned that sufficient liquid dollars in the Statesman
treasury would offer a reasonable opportunity of looting at a very
early date. But Mr. Noble also knew that he could not pull off a
devious deal all by himself. He equally well knew that Edward W.
Roth would not expose himself to any collateral chicanery of his own.
Roth made it clear: He would sell control, but beyond that Noble
was on his own. Noble must rely exclusively on himself, and the
cooperation of the Statesman board.
With Roth thus aloof, David J. Noble had only five directors to
bring into line. The entire five, however, must be privy to the sale of
control. Otherwise, an immediate and disastrous lawsuit by any
dissident would scotch the plan.
But the board's cooperation was assured. All five already knew
that the $6.8 million was settled. That Roth had agreed to appoint
Noble. That now each board member was in Noble's pocket, just as
he had been in Roth's. And for exactly the same reasons. Now Noble,
not Roth, was calling the shots. Salaries, brokerage commissions,
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banking business, social prestige, all were now in the power of Noble.
In a word, business as usual, simply a new contr6leur.
So David J. Noble detailed the stratagem. He stressed his inability
to get the $6.8 million. He reviewed the offer by the alien and
unsympathetic syndicate and the resultant loss of salaries, prestige
and financial benefits. The result was ready agreement by all. The
American Fletcher National Bank had long been Trustee for the
Statesman Employee Stock Ownership Plan, and appreciated the
business. And wanted to keep the business. And, yes, would happily
oblige with a loan, even a $10-million loan. The rest was a formality.
With few, or no, questions asked. So far, so good.
But the machinations had far from ended. True, Statesman now
had substantial lootable dollars in the treasury. But a major chore yet
remained: To get those dollars out of the Statesman till into Noble's
hands. Only then could Noble pass them on to Roth. The denouement
of The Statesman Story was at last at hand.
(6)

The Passing of the Premium-Bribe

[T]he evidence confirms the trial court's finding that Iowa
Mutual paid a [substantial] sum ... as a premium in return
for Mr. Alesch's delivery of control of the board of directors
of Le Mars Mutual.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
659 (Iowa 1979).
Perhaps once again Noble could take a leaf from the Iowa Mutual
book. When Iowa Mutual wanted to hide the premium-bribe-undoubtedly 'hide' is too complimentary, so clumsy was the ploy-it
decided to bury the $300,000 in an innocuous purchase of John
Alesch's little insurance agency, worth at most $100,000. The ruseunsuccessful in the event, since Iowa Mutual again got caught-called
for a sham value of $400,000 for the $100,000 agency. Clumsy as the
ploy may have been, it did successfully pass the $300,000 premiumbribe to John Alesch. (In fact, Iowa Mutual would have gotten away
with it, were it not for the purchase contract with all the details of
the illegal sale of control spelt out for all to see.) Again, David J.
Noble bethought himself of a possible variant on this pellucidly patent
camouflage.
If Iowa Mutual purchased an egregiously overvalued agency from
Alesch, what could Noble purchase from Roth and correspondingly
egregiously overvalue? The very question engendered the ideal answer.
Edward W. Roth owned a small block of Statesman common worth
roughly $3.1 million on the NASDAQ market. Even hypothesizing
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astute sales by Roth, paced over months to keep the market down,
Roth would nonetheless be able to net little more than $3.1 million
for his stock. Here, thought Noble, is the vehicle for carrying the
stipulated $6.8 million from Noble to Roth. Merely tack on the $6.8
million to the actual value of the stock, and who would know? Noble
could almost taste control.
To Noble's relief, Mr. Roth approved the plan. He was, after
all, 'impartial' and cared not a whit whence the premium-bribe dollars.
Furthermore, Mr. Roth had decided that he would just as lief make
a clean break with Statesman-exhibiting less than wholehearted
confidence in a Statesman under Noble-and divest himself of all his
shares when appointing Noble contr6leur in his stead.
The Noble Premium-Bribe
We find these directors failed to discharge their duties as
directors when even the most ordinary diligence on their
part would have prevented the surrender of their corporation
to Iowa Mutual.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
654 (Iowa 1979).
David J. Noble was particularly fascinated by this one-step
approach to the premium-bribery. Why, after all, wait until years
have passed to recoup his own premium-bribe dollars? And further,
the risk is no greater in embezzling at the outset-'recoupment in
advance,' as it were-vis-A-vis the Iowa Mutual two-step approach of
first using its own dollars and later recouping them.
But beyond the elimination of one unneeded step, Noble was
further intrigued by this direct route to the Statesman till. By 'cloaking' the premium-bribery in the purchase of Roth's shares, and by
using Statesman dollars directly, an untutored eye might not even see
that these were in fact embezzled dollars, Noble dollars. Further, all
Roth demanded was personal absolution of all responsibility. And
Noble had fully convinced Roth that the full responsibility for the
$6.8 million would rest with Noble and never be imputed to Roth
himself.
Roth understood the reality of the situation vividly. The most
important single fact in this entire Statesman Story, bar none, was
poignantly apparent to Roth. He not only tasted it, he savored it.
Noble had incontrovertibly accepted full responsibility, both legal and
moral, for the embezzled dollars in this one notable fact: Noble did
not initiate immediately a Statesman lawsuit against Roth for the
illegitimate $6.8 million over market. By that act-or better, failure
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to act-Noble took over, as his own, the passing of the $6.8 million
to Roth.
(For eleven long months-September, 1982 to the present-Roth
has been gone. Noble has been contr6leur, "Chairman and chief
executive officer," as the news releases said. More than any other
factor, Noble's acquiescence, as he watched the $6.8 million leave the
Statesman treasury, convinced Roth beyond any fear. By this acquiescence Noble told the world that these were his embezzled dollars
premium-bribing Roth for control of Statesman. So Roth went forward willingly, satisfied beyond cavil that all would hold Noble
responsible. In no way implicate him in the embezzlement. After all,
he was long gone.)
The Deed Done
Mr. Noble said the Statesman board deemed $10 million
"an appropriate figure" because of the size of Mr. Roth's
holdings. "We looked at this the same way we'd look at
buying a large block of shares of any company," Mr. Noble
said. Large blocks of stock often command a premium over
market value, he added.
-Statesman to Buy Its Chairman's Stake at Triple Market Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col. 5.
As the event would have it, all went well. The camouflage was
perfect, or at least so it seemed. Mr. Noble issued corporate news
releases that rang with pious platitudes:
Mr. Roth, 55 years old, intends to resign before Sept.
15 to pursue other business interests, the insurance holding
company said. D.J. Noble, president, will become chairman
and chief executive upon Mr. Roth's resignation. Mr. Roth
wasn't available for comment.
"It was a friendly negotiation. He's very much a family
man and has other business interests," Mr. Noble said. The
purchase of Mr. Roth's 509,994 shares, or 12% of the
common outstanding, will be financed with a bank loan, he
added.
-Statesman to Buy Its Chairman's Stake at Triple
Market Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col.
5.
Everything went according to script. Mr. Noble never even needed to
put his hands physically on the premium-bribe dollars. They left the
Statesman treasury and passed directly to Edward W. Roth at the
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time of the share purchase, that fateful September 3, 1982. The deal
had all the external habiliments of a normal repurchase arrangement.
Except, of course, for the fact, as the Wall Street Journaltrumpeted:
Statesman to Buy Its Chairman's Stake at Triple Market Rate.
Perhaps the public was truly deceived, or at least so it seemed. But
to any but a casual observer, the passing of control of Statesman
from Roth to Noble had no connection whatsoever, except tangentially, with the purchase of Roth's stock by Statesman.
The Aftermath
All parties agree that directorships in a corporation are
not for sale and that a contract for that purpose is illegal
and unenforceable.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
659 (Iowa 1979).
And thus it all transpired exactly according to plan. Mr. Roth
duly retired to pursue his other business interests, and Mr. Noble
indeed did become chairman and chief executive officer of Statesman.
With each succeeding month the tranquillity of the Roth days
became the tranquillity of the Noble days. The transition was made
with nary a ripple. Mr. Roth's old board seat was taken in course by
Mr. R. G. Dickinson, who headed up an investment firm latterly
acquired by Statesman. Beyond this, nothing changed. Messrs. Casady, Conyers, Clendenen, Ashton and O'Neill now became beholden
to David J. Noble. Now these men looked to Mr. Noble for their
salaries, perquisites, prestige and financial handouts.
In due order came the first annual meeting after the Roth exodus,
but nothing changed but the office of contr6leur. Now the annual
report and the proxy statement read: David J. Noble, Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer. As under Roth, so under
Noble. The subservient board dutifully approved all the Noble nominees for the upcoming board and, in predictable course, the sheepish
shareholders scattered across the nation rubber-stamped the Noble
nominees. The Roth sale of control to Noble was duly consummated
with the formalism of the May, 1983 annual meeting. Here finally
was the proof of the pudding. Mr. Noble's subtle plan was too
abstruse for the obtuse minds of the public shareholders of Statesman.
Or was it? Or was the Statesman Story just beginning?
II.

The Sale-of-Control Illegality

The principle that a contract to resign a public office or to
exert influence to secure the appointment of another is void
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as against public policy has been too long established to
require the citation of authority for its support, but see
cases collected ....
-Aughey v. Windrem, 137 Iowa 315, 320, 114 N.W.
1047, 1049 (1908).
The transaction gives Mr. Roth about triple the market
value for his Statesman stock.
D.J.
Mr. Roth, 55 years old, intends to resign ....
Noble, president, will become chairman and chief executive
upon Mr. Roth's resignation.
-Statesman to Buy Its Chairman'sStake at Triple Market Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col. 5.
With the facts of this lawsuit so laboriously spelt out in The
Statesman Story, the law must be applied to these facts with the same
diligence, and thus move forward toward the proof of the thesis of
this Brief: "That Statesman Group conforms in all particulars to The
Illegal Sale of Control reprobated in Le Mars, and hence warrants
the same sanctions of Le Mars."
The law underlying The Sale-of-Control Illegality can be laid out
most logically in three major divisions: (1) The Premium-BribeItself,
(2) The Intrinsic Illegitimacy of the Premium-Bribe, and (3) The
Disgorgement. All three produce far-reaching results.
(1)

The Premium-Bribe Itself

[The contr6leur] is bound to account for the money received
from Levy for the transfer to him and his associates of the
management and control of the Life Union, together with
its property and effects. The learned appellate division has
treated this transaction as a bribe paid to the directors ....
-McClure v. Law, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (N.Y. 1899).
Mr. Noble ... deemed $10 million "an appropriate
figure" because of the size of Mr. Roth's holdings. "We
looked at this the same way we'd look at buying a large
block of shares of any company," Mr. Noble said. Large
blocks of stock often command a premium over market
value, he added.
-Statesman to Buy Its Chairman'sStake at Triple Market Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col. 5.
New York's highest court was the first to characterize the price
paid for corporate office as a plain old bribe, and bribe it is. The
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modern term 'premium-bribe' has arisen as more apt because the
corporate bribe is most often 'hidden' in a 'premium,' an extra little
bonus added somewhere, e.g., in a sale of a stock block (most complex
Sale-of-Control cases feature a 'premium' over market for the contr6leur's personal shares), or perhaps in the collateral sale of an insurance
agency-the transparent subterfuge in Le Mars-or wherever. But
'bonus' or 'premium,' or 'premium-bribe,' no matter. The result is
the same: Bribery.
As it will do throughout this Brief, Le Mars sets the precedent.
Stripped of its complexities, the premium-bribe in The Illegal Sale of
Control as outlined in Le Mars carried five requisites: (1) The payment
of a $400,000 premium-bribe, (2) To John Alesch the incumbent
contr6leur of Le Mars, (3) By Iowa Mutual the would-be contr6leur,
(4) To induce the appointment to the office of control (5) With
scienter.
Understandably the principal malefactors in Statesman did notsince one could conjecture that they had closely read Le Mars-reduce
to writing forthright admissions of these five Le Mars requisites. But
if ever 'actions spoke louder than words,' the detailed events of the
Statesman Story were not reticent in painting a vivid picture of Bribery
in a Corporate Guise. From all these undeniable events, a logical
mind is impelled inexorably, willy-nilly, to the conclusion of premiumbribery. The indisputable facts permit no other rational result.
From the central events of the Statesman Story, plus the several
supporting records and myriad confirming facts, emerges the technical
definition of Premium-Bribery:
Broken down into its five principal parts, the sale-ofcontrol premium-bribe can thus be technically defined as:
(1) Some form of consideration, monetary or otherwise, (2)
Flowing to the incumbent contr6leur, (3) From or on behalf
of the prospective contr6leur, (4) To induce the appointment
to the office of control, (5) Paid knowingly, scienter.
-Bayne,
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 497 (1969).
Each of these parts is realized in the Roth Sale of Control to Noble.
Monetary Consideration
Broken down ... : (1) Some form of consideration,
monetary or otherwise.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 497 (1969).
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The transaction gives Mr. Roth about triple the market
value for his Statesman stock.
-Statesman to Buy Its Chairman'sStake at Triple Market Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col. 5.
It is not uncommon for the malefactors in a sale of control to
attempt to camouflage the consideration that is the heart of the
premium-bribe. A five-year consulting contract is a favorite method.
Or secret 'gifts' to deserving relatives. Or to the incumbent contr6leur
himself. But the Roth/Noble transaction indulged in no such subtleties. The amount of the consideration was stated in a forthright
manner. More than that, it was proclaimed a "premium" openly in
the public press.
This first of the Le Mars essentials requires the positive identification of some object of value, otherwise unidentified or unexplained.
If, however, the consideration can be linked to any of numerous
legitimate transactions-for example, the true value of a stock purchase-clearly the first Le Mars requisite is missing. And the proof
of premium-bribery fails at the outset. Each of the five requisites is
essential.
The present task, therefore, is to segregate some 'monetary
consideration' from any legitimate value that could pass to the
contr6leur at the time of the transfer of control.
(Note: The consideration stipulated in Le Mars need not necessarily be 'monetary.' An incumbent could well be premium-bribed by
various nonmonetary favors, e.g., membership in an exclusive club,
appointment to public office, admission into a social enclave. But
again, Statesman posed no such subtleties and thus limits the proof
to countable dollars.)
Furthermore, this task of the isolation of the illegitimate from
the legitimate was obligingly performed by the principal malefactors
themselves. Loudly, even blatantly, in their own public press pronouncements. Mr. Noble began this process of isolation in his first
corporate news release, with an exact statement of the total amount
of consideration passing to the incumbent contr6leur, Roth. At this
point Mr. Noble made no attempt to separate any legitimate payment
from the illegitimate. Just the grand total:
Statesman Group Inc. said it will pay $10 million for the
shares, share options and employment contract of Edward
W. Roth, chairman and chief executive officer.
-Statesman to Buy Its Chairman's Stake at Triple
Market Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col.
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But then Mr. Noble took this $10 million and conveniently
divided it into its two constituent parts. Noble began this breakdown
with a detailed computation of the value of Mr. Roth's shares and
share options, the true value on the impartial public market:
The [Roth] interests acquired included 509,994 shares of the
Company's Common Stock [and] presently exercisable options to purchase 68,520 shares ....
On the day prior to the Agreement with the Roth
family, the mean between the bid and ask prices for the
Common Stock of the Company was $5.06.
-Notice of Annual Meeting & Proxy Statement from
The Statesman Group, Inc. to Stockholders at 5 (Apr.
13, 1983) [(on file at Northern Illinois University Law
Review)].
Elementary arithmetic translates these 624,174 shares (including the
options), at $5.06 each, into a total market value of $3,158,320.40.
Clearly, this calculation of $3.15 million poses no particular
problem for the fact finder. The market in Statesman was an admittedly reliable norm of true value. Statesman is widely traded nationally
in the over-the-counter market, flashed on thousands of NASDAQ
terminals and listed daily in all major newspapers of the country.
With four-million-plus shares in the hands of 4,800 shareholders, the
market in Statesman, moreover, could scarcely be characterized as
'thin,' and hence is a truly dependable gauge of the actual worth of
the Roth interests.
Further, this $3.15-million evaluation is generous. To unload the
not inconsiderable 624,174 shares onto the open market would undeniably have a depressive effect on the price of Statesman. Thus, even
conceding paced sales, with anonymous brokers in various cities, over
an extended period of time, nonetheless Mr. Roth would not net a
figure over $3.15 million.
But the other side of the coin is even more revealing. Why Mr.
Roth's shares? What intrinsic allure enhanced his shares? Would not
600,000 identical public shares have been just as good as Mr. Roth's?
(This assumes the preposterous premise that Statesman needed to buy
any shares, Mr. Roth's included.) Why not a purchase at $5.06 per
share, in paced sales, through anonymous brokers, and thus keep the
market down? No need to pay "about triple the shares' current
market value." Some 6-million shares in the hands of 4,800 shareholders stood ready for purchase at $5.06. And Mr. Roth received
$15. Need more be said to prove that only $3.15 million of the $10
million may be justly attributed to the Roth shares? The rest was
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'monetary consideration,' unidentified and unexplained. And certainly
unrelated to the share purchase.
Using the Noble-supplied figures, therefore, one would simply
subtract the $3.15 million from the admitted $10-million total to reach
an unaccounted-for $6.8 million.
(In this unexplained $6.8 million, Mr. Roth included $500,000,
the amount stipulated to buy up his employment contract. Obviously,
no such $500,000 cancellation would have occurred had not Noble
premium-bribed Roth out of office.)
To call this $6.8 million 'unidentified' is, however, not exactly
accurate. Again Mr. Noble most obligingly called a spade a spade,
and admitted a 'premium' had been passed. And for no stated reason.
Mr. Noble said the Statesman board deemed $10 million
"an appropriate figure" because of the size of Mr. Roth's
holdings. "We looked at this the same way we'd look at
buying a large block of shares of any company," Mr. Noble
said. Large blocks of stock often command a premium over
market value, he added.
-Statesman to Buy Its Chairman's Stake at Triple
Market Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col.
5.
What Mr. Noble failed to add, however, was an adversion to the
amount of the premium. Were one to concede, strictly arguendo, that
a large block does "often command a premium"-and in the Roth/
Noble sale of control no 'premium' of any kind would be justifiableeven 30 percent over market would be unconscionable. But 300 percent
defies even uncontrolled fantasy.
Note well, this first of the Le Mars essentials requires no proof
of the purpose or of the nature of this monetary consideration. All
that is mandated now is the actual existence of some monetary
consideration otherwise unexplained and unidentified. No attempt is
made, furthermore, to specify the source or to trace the destination
of this consideration. The mere fact, without more, was all that the
Le Mars Court stipulated.
Thanks to the forthright-even naive, considering the illegality
of his scheme-admissions of Mr. Noble, therefore, the legitimate
consideration-the $3.15-million market value of the Roth interestswas prominently segregated from the illegitimate-the $6.3-million
"premium over market value" plus the $0.5 million for the contractattributable even by the malefactors to no licit cause. This proof of
the first Le Mars essential encountered no serious obstacle. Res ipsa
loquitur.
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To the Incumbent Contr6leur
Broken down ... : (2) flowing to the incumbent controleur [Roth]....
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 497 (1969).
Statesman will pay Mr. Roth about $15 for each of
those shares . . ., Mr. Noble said. That's . . . about triple
the shares' current market value. Statesman common traded
over the counter yesterday, at $5 ....
-Statesman to Buy Chairman'sStake at Triple Market
Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982. at 24, col. 5.
On occasion, the premium-bribe consideration is not
only visibly present but its path to a point of rest in the
contr6leur is also unmistakable. More often, however, the
path is more like a maze.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 499 (1969).
But always obliging, Messrs. Roth and Noble eschewed the
'maze,' and tracked a highly traceable spoor along a straight
"path
to a point of rest in the contr6leur." The proof of this second of the
Le Mars essentials is therefore as effortless as was the first. Neither
Roth nor Noble made any attempt to conceal that Mr. Roth, the
incumbent contr6leur, was the ultimate destination of the $6.8 million
in 'monetary consideration.'
Indeed, so forthright were these admissions-admissions? Boaststhat Mr.Roth was the recipient, that a psychoanalyst would be hardpressed to interpret them:
The transaction gives Mr. Roth about triple the market
value for his Statesman stock ... $10 million for the shares,
share options and employment contract ....
Mr. Noble ... deemed $10 million "an appropriate
figure" . ...
-Statesman to Buy Its Chairman's Stake at Triple
Market Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col.
5.
Was this "triple the market value," $6.3 million, a brazen affront to
the Statesman shareholders? Did Mr. Roth reason that he was above
the law? Invulnerable to claims of premium-bribery? That he could
ride roughshod over minority rights?
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Or was it callow naivete? Did Mr. Roth believe that no one
would question $6.8 million for the appointment of his successor?
Such ingenuousness ill becomes a hardened contr6leur. Especially one
who has kept a stranglehold on Statesman from its earliest days.
Ingenue Mr. Roth was not.
Perhaps the correct analysis would attribute all these blatant news
releases, not to Edward W. Roth, but to David J. Noble. Perhaps
Mr. Noble was so exultant at donning the mantle that he rushed
thoughtlessly to the press to boast of his ascendancy. And in the
process admitted openly, even unwittingly, that Mr. Roth was receiving such an unconscionable sum for the relinquishment of his office.
Perhaps the word should rather read 'wroth.' With Mr. Noble, that
is.
But whatever conjecture best explains the facts, no matter. The
sole point for present proof is that Edward W. Roth, then-incumbent
contr6leur, received $6.8 million in 'monetary consideration.' Thus
the second of the two Le Mars requisites is as easily established as
was the first.
From the Prospective Contr6leur
Broken down . . .: (3) From or on behalf of the prospective contr6leur [Noble].
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 497 (1969).
D.J. Noble, president, will become chairman and chief
executive upon Mr. Roth's resignation.
-Statesman to Buy Chairman's Stake at Triple Market
Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col. 5.
As with the identification of the consideration and its
proven reference to the incumbent [Roth], the verification
of the third element is at worst not a greatly demanding
assignment for the fact finder.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 500 (1969).
The isolation of the $6.8 million in 'monetary consideration' was
readily accomplished. So, too, was the indisputable identification of
Edward W. Roth as the recipient of that $6.8 million. Thus far, the
spoor is unmistakable.
But at this turn in the tracking, the pattern of guilelessness
disappears. And an admonition of some 14 years ago is pertinent in
tracing the $6.8 million directly to (or better, 'from') David J. Noble:
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Whether there is a patent payment directly from the
appointee himself [Noble], or indirectly from some third
party, or a complicated series of moves from the controlled
corporation [Statesman], one overriding principle prevailsthe consideration must be the primary responsibility of the
appointee [Noble]. Regardless of appearances, all three
sources must be reducibly the same.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 501 (1969) (emphasis
added).
For the first time in this unfolding tale, the actors have, arguably
by design, camouflaged their actions. Not fully, but somewhat. At
any event, some modicum of perspicacity will penetrate the camouflage and point to David J. Noble as the sole source of the $6.8
million in 'monetary consideration' passing to Edward W. Roth.
Perhaps it would be flattery to credit David J. Noble with "a
complicated series of moves," but the fact remains that the $6.8
million was not "a patent payment directly from" Noble. Rather, the
$6.8 million came from "the controlled corporation" itself, Statesman. But this gambit was not exactly a Noble invention. The ploy
was slightly devious but far from original:
Although definitely begging a later question, nearly
every successful premium-bribe is sooner or later recouped
from the corporation [Statesman]. Often, however, the new
appointee [Noble] avoids the circuity of a personalpayment
and later ... recoupment by an immediate raid on the
[Statesman] corporate till.
-Bayne,
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 502 (1969) (emphasis
added).
Which, of course, is exactly what appointee Noble did. Putting the
matter grossly, and tracing the circuity move by move, one can see
that Noble simply stole the $6.8 million directly from Statesman and
paid it over to Roth, pursuant to agreement. At this point, however,
this complicated circuity must not be left to conjecture. Every step
must be analyzed and proven beyond doubt.
At this stage of the argumentation, some slight summary will
give the correct perspective for this third Le Mars requisite: The
"consideration must be the primary responsibility of the appointee"
David J. Noble. That is the ultimate goal for the proof. Noble must
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be responsible for the $6.8 million. Toward this goal, two arresting
truths have already been established incontestably:
(1) Roth passed control to Noble.
(2) Someone passed $6.8 million to Roth.
These two indisputables occurred simultaneously. At the same hour
of the same day, in total interrelation. And in the face of an alien
third party ready to pass a competing premium-bribe. One passably
well-versed in business rudiments-he need be neither a cynic nor an
expert-would make a ready deduction from the mere conjunctionwithout more-of these two truths that the $6.8 million "consideration
[is in truth] the primary responsibility of" David J. Noble.
Reflect momentarily on these two truths. Roth handed over to
Noble a valuable asset: Control of Statesman. (Roth could have
handed Statesman over to the aliens.) Someone handed over to Roth
a valuable asset-$6.8 million-at the very time and in connection
with Roth's beneficence to Noble. No 'someone'-other than David
J. Noble-would have the slightest motivation in the world to shower,
suddenly and gratuitously, such an unthinkable sum of money on
Edward W. Roth. Grade-school logic would add one and one together,
and conclude unhesitatingly to David J. Noble as the only plausible
source of the $6.8 million. Why? To pay Roth for Noble's control.

Control of Statesman

__$6,800,000_

Were no other facts deducible, these two truths-this juxtapositionunaided would satisfy the requirement that "the consideration must
be the responsibility of the appointee" Noble. But one more fact-
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far and away the most important single fact in this entire Brief-can
be adduced with minimum rationalization.
The Unthinkable Lawsuit
One of the oldest financial services companies for the
garment trade, the William Iselin Company, yesterday said
that it had sued its former chief executive and two former
employees, charging them with conspiring with a large
apparel group to defraud Iselin of more than $15 million
from 1978 through 1982.
-C.L T. 's Factoring Unit Sues Ex-Chief, Others, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 24, 1983, at D1, col. 3.
Consider reflectively for a moment the only alternative. Before
September 3, 1982 Edward W. Roth was in unchallenged control of
Statesman. After that date, David J. Noble was in unchallenged
control of Statesman. The $6.8 million left the Statesman till on
September 3, 1982. Who of the two was responsible? If the dollars
are attributable to Noble, a credible sale of control transpired. But
what if the responsibility lay rather with Roth?
Suppose that Mr. Roth, as the all-powerful contr6leur, decided
simply to loot the Statesman treasury as a farewell memento? Suppose
David J. Noble was not, in fact, directly a party to a Roth looting?
Suppose then that an honest and conscientious David J. Noble ascends
in due course to the control of Statesman, and Mr. Roth hies himself
hence to his "other business interests," $6.8 million in pocket. What
then?
An honest and conscientious Mr. Noble, bearing no direct responsibility for the $6.8 million, would survey the scene and see a
disturbing sight. Here was his predecessor in office absconding in his
closing days with an unexplained $6.8 million in Statesman funds,
with nary an intimation of a justifiable reason. The $6.8 million was
certainly not deferred compensation. A 'farewell present' would be
laughable. Even 30 percent over market for the small stock block
would be open to court attack. But a 300-percent markup is looting,
pure and simple.
Even the layman Noble would not need an opinion of corporate
counsel that Statesman had an open-and-shut case against Edward
W. Roth. And being an honest and conscientious contr6leur, David
J. Noble would immediately initiate litigation on behalf of Statesman
to recover the $6.8 million. Would not Noble, with the doors of the
Statesman safe ajar, the $6.8 million missing, have pursued the thief?
Assuming, of course, the untenable assumption that the astute Roth
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would be so gauche as to steal. Especially when he had a secure and
alien premium-bribe in the wings.
Were Mr. Roth in truth responsible for these millions, and were
David J. Noble in truth conscientious and honest, a direct Statesman
lawsuit against Roth would have long since been begun. But such
conjecture is fanciful. Mr. Roth was not responsible, at least directly,
for the $6.8 million. Mr. Noble was, in fact, neither conscientious
nor honest. And in one overarching fact lies the proof of this Brief:
By his refusal to have Statesman pursue the $6.8 million, by his
acquiescence in the transmission of these dollars to Mr. Roth, David
J. Noble assumed incontrovertibly the full responsibility for passing
premium-bribe dollars to Roth. The safe doors were not in fact ajar.
Nor was Mr. Roth a thief. The dollars came from Noble. Here, then,
is the key to all the machinations.
Add this salient fact-the refusal of Noble to retake the $6.8
million-to the conjunction of the two truths-already sufficient to
place responsibility on Mr. Noble-and the argumentation is complete. In truth, Edward Roth did not abscond with Statesman dollars.
In truth, those dollars were stolen by David J. Noble-true, with the
knowledge and connivance of Roth-and his was the primary responsibility. Those words of so long ago were a presage:
Often, however, the new appointee [Noble] avoids the circuity of a personal payment and later ... recoupment by
an immediate raid on the [Statesman] corporate till.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 502 (1969).
The conjunction of the two truths and the Noble refusal to pursue
Roth, left Noble clearly responsible:
Whether there is a patent payment directly from the
appointee himself [Noble], or indirectly from some third
party, or a complicated series of moves from the controlled
corporation [Statesman], one overriding principle prevailsthe consideration must be the primary responsibility of the
appointee [Noble]. Regardless of appearances, all three
sources must be reducibly the same.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 501 (1969).
So, in the end, the $6.8-million premium-bribe was in fact "the
primary responsibility of the appointee," David J. Noble. And it
must be said, perhaps too flatteringly, that the dollars did come "in
a complicated series of moves from the controlled corporation,"
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Statesman. Noble, in effect, had embezzled the $6.8 million.
To this point, therefore, the argumentation has seen (1) $6.8
million in monetary consideration (2) Flowing to the incumbent
contr6leur, Edward W. Roth, (3) From or on behalf of the prospective
contr6leur, David J. Noble. The remaining proof of the presence of
a premium-bribe is equally effortless.
To Induce the Appointment
Broken down . .. [:] (4) to induce the appointment to
the office of control ....
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 497 (1969).
When some consideration, clearly identified, has passed to
the incumbent controleur from the prospective appointee
under circumstancesreasonably related to the control transfer, a rebuttable presumption arises that the purpose of
such consideration is to induce the appointment.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 507-08 (1969) [(emphasis in original)].
Had Messrs. Roth and Noble a legitimate reason for passing the
$6.8 million, they undoubtedly would have 'proclaimed it from the
housetops.' But no such proclamation ever issued, in spite of the
news releases that discussed the transfer of control so openly.
The fact may be that the parties are readily able to
prove a purpose totally unrelated to a premium-bribe. The
consideration flowing at the time of the transfer may in
truth be a genuine quid for a legitimate quo, a long-due
debt, deferred salary, or even a gracious gift. But these
alien purposes must be flushed out, and the burden lies on
the payor and payee to do the flushing.
-Bayne,
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 507 (1969).
But clearly Messrs. Roth and Noble made no attempt "to do the
flushing," and this in spite of the fact that they did attempt to explain
publicly the $6.8 million passing to Mr. Roth. No mention was made
of "a genuine quid for a legitimate quo." Had Mr. Roth held "a
long-due debt," certainly that debt would receive prominent attention.
So, too, with "deferred salary." As for "a gracious gift," such a gift
would hardly be appropriate for an outgoing contr6leur relinquishing
his control of the company.
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The reason for the silence is clear. Messrs. Roth and Noble were
simply not "able to prove a purpose totally unrelated to a premiumbribe." The only explanation-"Large blocks of stock often command a premium"-was so specious as to be no explanation at all.
A premium of 300 percent, passing "to the incumbent contr6leur
[Roth] from the prospective appointee [Noble] under circumstances
reasonably related to the control transfer" leads to one inescapable
conclusion: The 'premium' dollars were passed "to induce the appointment." This $6.8-million premium passed from Noble to Roth
at the very instant of the transfer of control from Roth to Noble. In
short, this 'monetary consideration' could not be more intimately
related to the transfer of control.
These reflections complete the analysis . . . . The parties to a transfer of control are faced with two governing
principles: (1) Any consideration passing at the time of
transfer must be explained. (2) Any unexplained consideration is presumed to have been passed to induce appointment.
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Defini-Bayne,
tion, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 515 (1969).
This leaves only the fifth and last of the Le Mars essentials.
Paid Knowingly, Scienter
Broken down . . .: (5) Paid knowingly, scienter.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The
Definition, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 497 (1969).
There is no rule better established respecting the disposition of every office in which the public are concerned
than this, detur digniori [let it be given to the more suitable]:
on principles of public policy no money-consideration ought
to influence the appointment to such offices.
-Blachford v. Preston, 4 Rev. Rep. 598, 601 (K.B. 1799)
(emphasis added).
The real question is not the simple one of 'scienter, paid knowingly,' but rather 'scienter, paid deliberately, callously, with long
months of malice aforethought.' The full extent of moral culpabilityof assent of intellect and freedom of will-was reiterated in the
countless instances of calculated planning that characterized the Saleof-Control Premium-Bribery of Edward W. Roth and David J. Noble.
"The conduct ... was so intentional, malicious, reckless and indifferent as to require the award of punitive damages . . . ." (Rowen v.
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Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., Equity No. 22725, slip op. at 22 (Iowa Dist.
Ct., Plymouth County, Oct. 3, 1977).)
The fact of Premium-Bribery is simple. The law, complex.
(2)

The Intrinsic Illegitimacy of the Premium-Bribe

In the entire control spectrum, the legitimacy of the
premium-bribe is probably the most basic, the most vexing,
and certainly the most recurrent question.
-Bayne,
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 216 (1969).
The authorities are agreed that the officers and directors of
a company are trustees . . . in the transaction of the business
and care of property of the corporation ....
-Dawson v. National Life.Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 369,
157 N.W. 929, 931 (1916).
Understandably, the overall law of corporate control encompasses
a broad field. Every action of the contr6leur-that topmost person in
the corporate hierarchy-is regulated by the law of corporate control.
Necessarily these actions span the entire spectrum of corporate activity.
And within this spectrum of the contr6leur's manifold activitiesand his corresponding obligations-the sale of his office for a price
poses the most arresting challenge to control law. Sale-of-Control
Premium-Bribery calls into play all the major principles of the philosophy of corporate control. Further than that the overall philosophy
finds its most impressive expression at that charged instant when
corporate control is sold for a price.
The fact of the premium-bribe has been established. The five Le
Mars essentials have been verified. With these factual necessaries in
hand, the positive argumentation resumes.
The all-pervading fact of Statesman has been the absolute and
uninterrupted domination by Edward W. Roth.
In December, 1971 control ... of the company [Statesman Life] was obtained by chairman of the board and
former president Edward W. Roth ....
-Best's Insurance Reports: Life-Health 1942 (1982).
And so it went through all the years, up to the present. Mr. Roth
maintained unfailingly his personal domination of the directors and
the proxy-solicitation mechanism. This interreacting twin control proved
unbeatable.
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Confidence-Reliance-Dependence
The very selection for service is an expression of confidence
and the employment the bestowal of power. The shareholder
selects the director to serve him in caring for the corporate
property. . . . Is he not thereby expressing his confidence?
• . . He trusts all with the managing officers, and naturally
relies on them in all matters touching his interest in its
business and property.
-Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 376,
157 N.W. 929, 933 (1916).
The Supreme Court of Iowa-and the same must be said of most
jurisdictions-truly understands this most fundamental of all corporate-control principles. The concise enunciation by the Dawson Court
showed a commendable grasp of the ultimate basis of corporate Strict
Trust. As the Iowa Court intimated, in constructing the bottommost
foundation for the law of corporate control, one can go no deeper,
become no more basic, than this: The helpless entity is nakedly
dependent-its assets, its structure, its personnel, its policy-on the
raw power of the contr6leur. In the contr6leur the owners have placed
unquestioning confidence. On the contr6leur, complete reliance, without more.
And so it was with Statesman. Assets, policy, personnel, everything, were totally dependent on the will of Edward W. Roth. On
him alone the shareholder owner 'naturally relied.' Their 'very selection' of Edward W. Roth was 'an expression of confidence.'
Finally and most important, both confidence and reliance are reducible to dependence. It is interesting that
Webster gives two direct synonyms for dependence: "reliance" and "trust." The note of dependence is the element
most expressive of the true status of one who reposes
confidence in another. A dependent person is subject to, in
the power of, another. This dependence is coterminous with
the orbit of reliance[/]confidence. The dependence in the
one finds the correlative independence in the other ....
No more ultimate constituent of the trust lies beyond
or beneath this dependence.
-Bayne, Corporate Control As a Strict Trustee, 53
Geo. L.J. 543, 557 (1965).
The extent to which the Supreme Court of Iowa intuited this
ultimate concept is arresting:
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The fiduciary relation may exist wherever special confidence is reposed, whether the relationship be that of blood,
business, friendship or association, by one person in another
who are in a position to have and exercise or do have and
exercise influence over each other. Curtis v. Armagast, 158
Iowa 507.
-Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362,
376-77, 157 N.W. 929, 933 (1916).
In the case of Statesman, this confidence, reliance, dependence, was
total. Statesman was in the complete custody of Edward W. Roth.
The Custodial Concept of Corporate Control
[The contr6leur] has custody only, not ownership. The
corporation is merely entrusted to an office, not given to
an individual. The custodian must guard, guide and nurture
the corporation as if it were his own, with full knowledge
that it belongs to another.
-Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 22, 32 (1963).
The directors have the custody and control of the assets of
the corporation for the benefit of those to whom they belong
-Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208, 214 N.W. 718,
720 (1927).
The nexus is immediate between the confidence, reliance, dependence, and the next logical development of the law of Strict Trust.
The human mind moves inexorably from the total dependence of the
corporation to the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control. Herein
lies the first major trust concept.
In the theoretical-but very real-beginning of every
corporation the shareholder owners in a deliberate appropriation entrust the corporate assets to the untrammeled
dominion of that necessary top-level authority, the contr6leur. In acquiescing to this appropriation the contr6leur
thereby asumes custody of the entity, with all its duties and
rights. Technically, therefore, corporate control is a relation
of total custody subsisting between the subjective term, the
office of control, and the objective term, the corporate
entity itself.
-Bayne, The Noninvestment Value of Control Stock,
45 Ind. L.J. 317, 333 (1970).
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With continuing commendable insight, the Supreme Court of Iowa
expressed this custodial concept in similar words:
The ordinary stockholder gives little or no attention to the
details or control of corporate affairs. He trusts all with the
managing officers, and naturally relies on them in all matters touching his interest in its business and property ...
[Plower akin to that of an attorney, priest, agent or copartner is conferred on the directors and officers by those
selecting them to manage corporate affairs.
-Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362,
376, 157 N.W. 929, 933 (1916).
And again, with even greater directness:
The directors are primarily trustees for the corporation and
its stockholders, and it is their duty to manage the affairs
of the corporation and administer its assets in accordance
with the law and legal rights of all persons interested ...
The directors have the custody and control of the assets of
the corporation for the benefit of those to whom they belong
-Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 208, 214 N.W. 718,
720 (1927).
On this foundation of custody the Iowa Court moved effortlessly to
the inescapable conclusion:
The fiduciary obligation is owing the stockholders in a body.
... "Whether the corporation be treated as an enlarged
and amplified form of partnership and the director as
managing partner, or whether he is called an agent or trustee
elected by the stockholders to represent them in the management of the concern, he occupies a fiduciary position
-Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362,
376, 381, 157 N.W. 929, 933, 935 (1916). (quoting
Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 369, 45 S.E. 232, 234
(1903)).
Thus far-and it is so to the end-Edward W. Roth, contr6leur, and
Statesman, helpless beneficiary, verify every element of the Custodial
Concept of Corporate Control outlined by the Iowa Court.
Strict Trust
Since the scope of [the contr6leur's] responsibility is
coterminous with the extent of the custody, it follows that
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the responsibility of the [contr6leur] is total because the
entire corporate entity has been entrusted to [the contr6leur].
-Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 22, 33 (1963).
Equity holds them strictly accountable as trustees.
-Holden v. Construction Machinery Co., 202 N.W.2d
348, 358 (Iowa 1972).
Nor did the Iowa Court stop short with a watered-down definition
of the 'fiduciary duty' incumbent on the contr6leur. To the Iowa
Court the logical consequences of custody were the rigid stringencies
of Strict Trust. (And these stringencies include notably the Benefitto-Beneficiary Rule.)
"The fact that he is [a] trustee for all is not to be
perverted into holding that he is under no obligation to
each. . . . That he is primarily trustee for the corporation
is not intended to make the artificial entity a fetich to be
worshipped in the sacrifice of those who, in the last analysis,
are the real parties at interest."
-Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362,
379, 380, 157 N.W. 929, 935 (1916) (quoting Oliver v.
Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 367, 45 S.E. 232, 233 (1903)).
For a correct understanding of the Iowa embrace of Strict Trust,
note that the Court draws the understandable dichotomy between the
contr6leur's Strict Trust obligation to the corporation itself, and his
quasi-trust duty to the shareholder in the course of individual contr6leur/shareholder transactions. Thus, although the contr6leur is a strict
trustee to the entity, to the private shareholder he is
[n]ot a strict trustee, since [the contr6leur] . . . does not
hold title to the shares; not even a strict trustee who is
practically prohibited from dealing with his cestui que trust;
but a quasi trustee as to the shareholder's interest in the
shares.
-Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362,
380, 157 N.W. 929, 935 (1916) (quoting Oliver v.
Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 367, 45 S.E. 232, 233 (1903)).
Thus, when the Iowa Court injects the qualification 'quasi-trustee'
into its definition, it intends only to qualify the Strict Trust duty of
the contr6leur to the individual shareholder directly, but not to the
entity itself and its assets.
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The Iowa Court refused to apply 'strict trustee' to the limited
dealings with the shareholder because of the absence of custody over
the shares. Custody over the entity, yes, but not over the shares.
Undoubtedly, he is not a trustee of the stockholder in the
strict sense, for he does not have title to the latter's stock.
His relation is that often denominated quasi trustee.
-Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362,
378, 157 N.W. 929, 934 (1916).
Thus, only in direct dealings with the entity and its assets does Iowa
hold the contr6leur to the full strictures of Strict Trust.
In later years this valid distinction occasionally becomes blurred.
Sometimes the Iowa Court uses 'quasi-trustee' when it means 'strict
trustee,' and vice versa. Throughout this Brief, however, the sole
concern is the contr6leur's custody of the corporation. His dealings
with individual shareholders never surface. Hence the 'possession of
title' to the shareholder's shares is of no matter. As to the contr~leur's
title to corporate assets:
[F]rom the custodial aspect the formal passage of title means
nil. The property tenure of [the] corporate [contr6leur] is
fully tantamount to actual possession of title and could
scarcely be more complete.
-Bayne, Corporate Control As a Strict Trustee, 53
Geo. L.J. 543, 561 (1965).
Clearly, the unfettered domination of the contr6leur would not be
any less fettered by formal possession of the title to the assets. From
a practical standpoint, the contr6leur has tantamount to title to the
entity.
Iowa, therefore, embraces fully the Strict Trust tradition, from
beginning to present. The Court in the 1972 Holden, quoting the 1953
Bechtel, employs the traditional Strict-Trust rule:
[D]irectors of a corporation are the agents of and act for
it, and indirectly for its stockholders, and they are trustees,
or quasi trustees, at least, of the property of the corporation
for the company and its stockholders.
-Holden v. Construction Machinery Co., 202 N.W.2d
348, 357 (Iowa 1972).
And this rule was later endorsed by the 1973 Holi-Rest v. Treloar
(217 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa)). The Iowa Court, therefore, holds the
contr6leur as a strict trustee of the corporation, and a 'quasi trustee,
at least,' of its stockholders.
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[W]e have never wavered from our insistence that those
holding fiduciary positions must act with a high degree of
fidelity ....
Those charged with corporate management hold
control on behalf of the shareholders ....
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
650-51 (Iowa 1979).
The Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule
"[Directors] impliedly undertake ... to exercise the powers
conferred solely in the interest of the corporation or the
stockholders as a body or corporate entity, and not for their
own personal interests."
-Schildberg Rock Products Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa
759, 767, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1966) (quoting 19 AM.
JUR. 2D Corporations § 1272 (1965) [(current version of
this principle is found in 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations
§ 1714 (1985))].
The Iowa Court in Schildberg nudged its Strict Trust reasoning
to the next logical level, to the most important Strict Trust corollary.
Necessarily Schildberg began by laying the Strict Trust base:
Our own and other decisions make it clear, and it is
conceded, that officers and directors of a corporation are
trustees or quasi-trustees of the corporate assets and occupy
a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders
-Schildberg Rock Products Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa
759, 766, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1966).
From this point, one inevitable step leads to the Strict Trust Benefitto-Beneficiary Rule:
Because this dependence [of the corporation on the
contr6leur] is total . . . the resultant responsibility is total.
This total responsibility for the stewardship of another's assets is merely a collective noun describing a complexus
of duties in regard to these assets. This complexus is the
essence of the benefit-to-beneficiary rule. This in turn is
only another way of saying that the custodian has a duty
to care for the assets entrusted to him as if they were his
own.
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This reasoning coalesces into one simple unqualified
rule enunciated in the Restatement: "The trustee is under a
duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiary." [Restatement (Second), Trusts
§ 170(1) (1959).]
-Bayne, Corporate Control As a Strict Trustee, 53
Geo. L.J. 543, 565-66 (1965).
Thus, to the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control must be added
the second major Strict-Trust concept: All benefit must inure to the
beneficiary.
And the Schildberg Court did just that. Directors, as trustees,
must act for the benefit of the corporation, and not
for their own personal interest. It is the policy of the law
to put fiduciaries beyond the reach of temptation by making
it unprofitable to yield to it. Accordingly an act by the
fiduciary in which personal interest and duty conflict is
voidable at the option of the beneficiary, regardless of good
faith.
-Schildberg Rock Products Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa
759, 766, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1966).
To that, the Court added a formal statement of the Rule:
"[Directors] impliedly undertake ... to exercise the powers
conferred solely in the interest of the corporation or the
stockholders as a body or corporate entity, and not for their
own personal interests."
-Schildberg Rock Products Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa
759, 767, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1966) (quoting 19 AM.
JUR. 2D Corporations §1272 (1965) [(current version
of this principle is found in 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1714 (1985))].
At another point the Schildberg Court was even more blunt in its
statement of the Rule: In the face of a conflict between contr6leur
and corporation, if
"the interests of the corporation are betrayed, the corporation may elect to claim all of the benefits of the transaction for itself, and the law will impress a trust in favor of
the corporation upon the property, interests and profits so
acquired."
-Schildberg Rock Products Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa
759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137 (1966) (quoting Guth
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v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 511
(1939)).
Which is to say that one who willingly assumes, as Edward W.
Roth did, the stewardship of millions of dollars of 'other people's
money'-other little neighborhood people's money-he has thereby
agreed "to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary." Nor does one need to be a moral theologian to enunciate the
Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule. Human nature defines clearly the duties
of the steward.
The implications of Strict-Trust and the Benefit-to-Beneficiary
Rule are pervasive. At every turn their cogency will carry the day.
But at this moment a special emphasis is in order.
Guth v. Loft
The doctrine . . .is but one phase of the cardinal rule
of undivided loyalty on the part of fiduciaries. [Citations.]
Our own consideration. . . is mainly in Ontjes v. MacNider,
. .232 Iowa 562, .. . which quotes at length with approval
from Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, a leading case in
this area of the law.
-Schildberg Rock Products Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa
759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137 (1966).
Guth v. Loft is indeed "a leading case in this area of the law,"
an area concerned exclusively with "the cardinal rule of undivided
loyalty on the part of fiduciaries." More pertinently, Guth has been
(until the 1976 Borden v. Sinskey by the Third Circuit) the prototypal
Strict Trust case in the United States. Guth has been cited and quoted
year after year across the nation, as well as in Iowa.
More to the point, Iowa has paraphrased and adopted the basic
tenet of Guth, the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule: In a conflict-of-interest
situation, all profits are disgorged to the corporation, all losses are
borne by the trustee. The transaction is void.
"If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation
of his duty as such, acquires gain or advantage for himself,
the law charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the
benefit of the corporation, at its election, while it denies to
the betrayer all benefit and profit. The rule, inveterate and
uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation
resulting from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader
foundation of a wise public policy that, for the purpose of
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removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit
flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed by the
fiduciary relation. Given the relation between the parties, a
certain result follows; and a constructive trust is the remedial
device through which precedence of self is compelled to give
way to the stern demands of loyalty .... Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545. ..."
-Ontjes v. MacNider, 232 Iowa 562, 578, 5 N.W.2d
860, 869 (1942) (other citations omitted) (quoting Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270-71, 5 A.2d 503,
510 (1939)).
Note well: When Guth cites Meinhard v. Salmon, all the strictures of
Partnership and Agency are in turn embodied into Guth, and thence
into Dawson, Hoyt, Ontjes, Schildberg, Holden, Holi-Rest, Le Mars,
and the long Iowa line. When then-Chief Judge Cardozo wrote
Meinhard v. Salmon he composed the finest statement of the loyalty
of a fiduciary. Partnership, Restitution and Agency law all impose
Strict Trust standards.
The Third Circuit's Borden
Applying the Doctrine first announced in Guth v. Loft
... the court below ... imposed a constructive trust in
favor of the plaintiff on Sinskey's stock .... In addition,
plaintiff was awarded ... the profit ... as well as all

salaries, director's fees and dividends received by him ....
-Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 489, 486-87 (3d Cir.
1976).
Borden is an ideal buttress to the specific holding of Le Mars
and to the entire Iowa, and national, line begun by Guth. Borden
affirmed unanimously a Federal District Court. Borden denied a
Rehearing, en banc. The entire Circuit, nine judges, approved.
And Borden applied Strict Trust with religious exactitude, totally
true to the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule. The corporate trustee, in
Conflict of Interest, disgorged every penny. Not only the stock but
the profit, fees, dividends. Even the salaries earned while working for
the beneficiary.
However, even if we were now to order an accounting, we
would not permit Sinskey to retain the reasonable value of
his services. Although defendants may be able to distinguish
the facts of Guth ... they cannot distinguish away the
rationale of that decision .... The [Guth] court refused to
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allow him to retain any of the profits or benefits derived
from his misconduct in order to deter any disloyalty on the
part of a corporate fiduciary.
-Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 497-98 (3d Cir.
1976).
Here is the Strict Trust of Guth in both theory and application.
And so does Iowa follow:
We have quoted quite extensively from this [Guth] case,
inasmuch as it is our conclusion that this late and wellreasoned expression of the Delaware court summarizes the
general holdings of the various jurisdictions and the several
texts and authorities which we have consulted.
-Ontjes v. MacNider, 232 Iowa 562, 579, 5 N.W.2d
860, 869 (1942).
Guth, Dawson, Hoyt, Ontjes, Schildberg, Holden, Holi-Rest,
Meinhard, Borden and Le Mars, all join forces in laying the most
stable Strict Trust foundation possible for Iowa, and everywhere.
"[Plersons enjoying management control hold it on behalf
of the corporation's stockholders ....
Any other rule
would violate the most fundamental principle . . . that
management must represent ... those who own the corporation."
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
651 (Iowa 1979) (quoting Essex Universal Corp. v.
Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962)).
But do not be confounded by terminology, or technicality. No
mystery enshrouds Strict Trust. The concept is elemental. If someone
entrusts his assets to another, the trustee must administer those assets
as if his own, but for the exclusive benefit of the owner. It is as
simple as that.
The painstaking study of Strict Trust has thus far progressed
through the Custodial Concept of Corporate Control and its immediate corollary, the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule. Edward W. Roth, in
assuming complete dominion over Statesman, correspondingly assumed complete responsibility for its well-being:
In one indivisible act the contr6leur accepts the absolute
stewardship of the entity and thereby acknowledges, and
accedes to, the mandatory norms of corporate excellence.
At that moment he becomes a strict trustee, with all the
demands of unswerving loyalty and devotion to corporation
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and shareholders. He assents unreservedly to every implication of the benefit-to-beneficiary rule.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 220 (1969) (citations
omitted).
The applicability of the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule extends to
every facet of the contr6leur's conduct of corporate affairs. Necessarily the Rule is not limited solely to the context of the Sale of
Control. In its broadest application, the Rule specifies into three

major objectives: (1) The erection of the best possible
corporate structure, (2) The employment of the most enlightened managerial policy; (3) The selection of the most competent personnel.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Quandary, 51 Cornell
L.Q. 49, 59 (1965).
Of these three all-encompassing goals, only the third, the selection of
competent personnel, affects intimately the present study, namely the
choice of a successor to Edward W. Roth. Of all the acts of Mr.
Roth's tenure, the most crucial was appointing David J. Noble. At
this instant, the third subduty of the Benefit-to-Beneficiary Rule has
preeminent applicability:
As important as is the chairman, the chief executive officer,
the operating head, the board, nevertheless the role of the
successor to the contr6leur is transcendent. Those norms of
selection of personnel that [governed] the incumbent contr6leur during tenure, guide him as well in departing that
tenure, in the proper and beneficial transfer of control. The
choice of a successor is undeniably the crowning act of the
contr6leur's career, as well as his last, and hence invites the
commensurate scrutiny of the standards of a fiduciary.
-Bayne, The Sale of CorporateControl, 33 Fordham
L. Rev. 583, 591, 592 (1965).
All this is an elemental deduction from the Benefit-to-Beneficiary
Rule. The entire future of Statesman rested with Noble. Yet, to buy
the appointment, Noble passed a $6.8-million premium-bribe to the
incumbent Edward W. Roth.
At this point the reasoning leads to the next major proposition:
The premium-bribe is in its essence corrupt. "For the avoydinge of
corrupcon, everie suche bargaynes shalbe voide."
Although plaintiffs advance other theories attacking
the sale of Alesch, Inc. to Iowa Mutual, we depend, as did
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the trial court, on the illegal sale of control to set aside the
transaction ...
The sale of control of a corporation has been declared
to be violative of public policy ....
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
650 (Iowa 1979).
That proposition supports the remainder of the Brief.
[T]he legitimacy, or illegitimacy, of the premium-bribe is
focal to every later Sale-of-Control analysis-the suitability
of the prospective contr6leur [Noble], the culpability of the
incumbent [Roth], possible damages, the disposition and
role of the premium-bribe itself. . . . Here all the theories
and principles push forward for concrete dollars-and-cents
application in day-to-day interplay.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 216-17 (1969).
This one statement would seem to encompass most of the pending
issues.
The Suitability of the Successor
From the aspect of either contr6leur or successor,
therefore, the rule is clear: The benefit to beneficiary and
the suitability of the appointee are the only legitimate
considerations at the time of appointment. Suitability is the
sole final cause that may flow legitimately into the selection
of the new contr6leur.
-Bayne,
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 221 (1969).
The heart of the corruption inherent in the premium-bribe,
therefore, is the appointment of a new contr6leur for any reason
other than his suitability. With Edward W. Roth, the 'reason other'
was premium-bribe dollars. The suitability of David J. Noble was far
from the thoughts of Edward W. Roth. (A cynic might even conjecture
that Roth's sale of all his stock was actually a bail-out and a
recognition of the unsuitability of Mr. Noble.)
Interestingly, however, the blame lay equally on Mr. Noble. Mr.
Roth was bribed. But Noble did the bribing. And Noble had already
agreed to assume the stewardship of Statesman.
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At that split conceptual second when the premium-bribe
is changing hands the fiduciary duty of a strict trustee rests
with exactly equal weight on the outgoing contr6leur and
the incoming appointee. At this transitional moment corporate custody is being entrusted by the one and accepted
by the other. The bonum commune of the entity rests in a
delicate balance between incumbent and successor. Each
consequently faces the identical custodial obligation defining
the suitability of the successor-contr6leur.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 221 (1969).
Henceforward remember that Noble and Roth had conspired
together, over many days, to pass and receive the premium-bribe.
Each had assumed the custody of Statesman.
Wherein, therefore, lies the 'corrup~on' inherent in the premiumbribe?
The totality of the turpitude of the premium-bribe consists
of three conceptually distinct elements caused by separate
breaches of fiduciary duty, each with its own peculiar
contribution and coalescing into a distinctive moral unit.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
(1969).
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 221-22
This triple turpitude of Premium-Bribery has been described as
(1) the perversion of the judgment of the incumbent contr6leur, engendered by an appointment of a successor induced
by a cause other than suitability, (2) that is, for consideration illicit in itself, (3) resulting in the appointment of a
candidate unsuitable by reason of his own active role in the
inducement.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 222 (1969).
Each of these distinct elements must now be pulled out and explored
separately, because each is intertwined with each, and all three together comprise one indivisible act, Premium-Bribery. But the second-illicit consideration-is at the heart of the instant problem:
Disgorgement of the premium-bribe dollars into the Statesman treasury.
The Perversion, the Principal Illegitimacy
Moral turpitude is the deviation from acknowledged norms
of conduct. Any digression from the straight path to the
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goal of a suitable successor is culpable. . . . This is perfectly
true of the premium bribe perversion. No part of the illicit
cash has any relation whatsoever to the suitability of the

successor.

-Bayne,
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 224 (1969).

Both Edward W. Roth and David J. Noble had agreed to act in
all things for the benefit of Statesman. Both recognized that the
appointment of the all-powerful contr6leur entailed the maximum
potential of benefit-or of evil-for Statesman. If ever they were
bound "to act solely for the benefit of the company," it was then.
Yet this sole objective was pushed aside. No longer was the
welfare of Statesman the consideration. Rather, premium-bribe dollars
supplanted suitability as the final cause motivating the parties. Both
Roth and Noble turned away from their sworn promise.
This forcible turning away is the perversion. Syllogistically:
(1) The suitability of the successor is the sole final cause
that may flow legitimately into the selection of the new
contr6leur. (2) The consideration of the premium-bribe is
totally irrelevant, foreign, antagonistic to suitability. (3) Yet
the premium-bribe consideration does flow as a final cause
into the selection of a successor.
Here is the quintessence of the perversion.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 223 (1969).
In so far as premium-bribe dollars supplant suitability, thus far are
the parties perverted. Not a single premium-bribe dollar is legitimate.
The premium-bribe is wholly illegitimate.
The prefix "per" carries the important concept of
completeness into the meaning of perversion. "Per" is the
intensive, not the prepositional, prefix and correctly expresses the idea of thoroughness, totality, as in "perfervid,"
"pellucid" and more aptly in "perfect"-unsullied by any
foreign substance, integral. This is perfectly true of the
premium-bribe perversion. No part of the illicit cash has
any relation whatsoever to the suitability of the successor.
It is totally foreign, unrelated, antagonistic to suitability. It
is totally "other." As antagonistic, this cause enters into
the formation of the contr6leur's judgment of selection. As
completely foreign, with no admixture of suitability as a
cause, this illegitimate cause perforce supplants, to the total
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extent of its influx, the legitimate one. As totally supersessive, therefore, this causal influx is totally perverse-a perfect perversion.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 224 (1969).
This, then, is the principal element of the turpitude of the premiumbribe. Principal, yes, but not sole.
The Illicit Consideration
The perversion of the contr6leur's judgment may be the
core of the premium-bribe illegitimacy, but what of the cold
cash that constituted the consideration? After all, as the
New York court said in Caplan-Lionel, the "price ... being
paid for . .. control . .. [is] the all important emolument
of the transaction." Does this all-important emolument add
anything to the turpitude?
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
-Bayne,
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 233 (1969).
The transaction gives Mr. Roth about triple the market
value for his Statesman stock.
-Statesman to Buy Its Chairman'sStake At Triple Market Rate, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 24, col. 5.
Before, during and after the extensive premium-bribe negotiations, Edward W. Roth-a principal party to the malefaction-was
being amply and fully compensated for performing his various duties.
Among the most obvious duties were the selection and appointment
of a successor contr6leur for Statesman. Yet, at this very moment,
David J. Noble was passing $6.8 million to Edward W. Roth, to this
top corporate executive, as a corporate official, because of
his official position, and pocketed personally, even though
every minute of time and ounce of energy had been dedicated to the exclusive benefit of the beneficiary-shareholder.
Most important . . . the money was paid for the performance of an official corporate act, even though concededly
that act was seriously harmful to the corporate well-being.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 615, 637 (1969).
In a word, none of this $6.8 million belonged to Mr. Roth. Every
penny was accepted
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in compensation for corporate acts, performed pursuant to
a corporate program, in fulfillment of a corporate duty, in
the course of official business, during the regular workweek,
for which he was already amply remunerated.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 235 (1969).
Herein lay the second indivisible element of the triple turpitude:
Disloyalty in personally pocketing dollars rightfully belonging to
Statesman:
The chief illegitimacy of the [$6.8 million] rests in the
disloyalty inherent in the repudiation of the contr6leur's
unqualified dedication of all of his endeavors to the general
welfare of the firm.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 237 (1969).
Yet the perfidy in taking the $6.8 million had no intrinsic
connection with the perversion of contr6leur judgment. Either could
have been effected without the other. Each is a separate constituent
of the total turpitude.
(Interjection: The disloyalty of a steward is not the only charge
of turpitude levelled at Edward W. Roth:
Completely apart from custody and the loyalty strictures of a trustee, no employee from contr6leur to janitor
can licitly be paid twice for doing his job. The turpitude
consequent on the breach of the simple contractual quid
pro quo is generally characterized as dishonesty, or in less
refined circles as plain old stealing. This particular aspect
of the intrinsic illegitimacy of the premium-bribe, stemming
from the violation of commutative justice, is completely
nonfiducial and unrelated, at least in its primary sense, to
the custodial concept of corporate control.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 237-38 (1969).
This violation of commutative justice will serve as yet another imperative for the disgorgement of the premium-bribe.)
The Unsuitability of a Premium-Briber
The turpitude engendered by successor unsuitability stems
from the uncomplicated fact that the corporation is therewith burdened with all the potential damage and present
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disadvantages of an incompetent in the most important
position in the firm.
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
-Bayne,
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 240 (1969).
The third coconstituent of the triple turpitude has its peculiar
applicability later in the Brief. For now, however, it must round out
the total turpitude of the single indivisible act of Premium-Bribery.
This third turpitude is simple: Messrs. Roth and Noble conspired
to foist a known premium-briber on the firm. Edward W. Roth
consciously and deliberately selected a new contr6leur who was ready,
not only (1) to pass $6.8 million in premium-bribe, but brazenly (2)
to embezzle the very $6.8 million from the Statesman treasury.
This joint imposition by Roth and Noble of a premium-briber
on Statesman is the capstone of the illegitimacy:
In strict practicality, the crucial distinction for future
sale-of-control litigation lies in the built-in nature of the
premium-bribe-induced unsuitability. No true premium-bribe
under any conditions whatsoever can be passed without
engendering the triple blemish of the perversion, the illicit
consideration, and the resultant unsuitability. To the extent,
therefore, that an appointee is prepared (1) to twist the
judgment and (2) to divert the corporate dollars, thus far is
he already an unsuitable custodian. As thus unsuitable he
caps it off by imposing a premium-briber [himself] on the
firm. Whatever further deficiencies he may possess do not
affect this ever-present built-in disability.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 243 (1969).
Note well: This premium-bribe-induced unsuitability of David J.
Noble says nothing about his other possible unsuitabilities. One might
opine that anyone who would first embezzle $6.8 million, and then
premium-bribe his way into control, would have a propensity to other
malefactions. The present consideration, however, concerns only the
premium-bribe-induced unsuitability.
The Coalesced Turpitude
Being so long so close to the trees one forgets that the
forest is an integral moral unit, the single act of premiumbribery. Correspondingly, the tripartite turpitude is only
conceptually divisible. True, each of its indispensable coconstituents-the perversion, the illict consideration, the
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premium-bribe-engendered unsuitability-can be individually isolated in the abstract. Indeed, the illicit consideration
can even have an independent existence of its own. Each
certainly is a distinct turpitude, with its own individuating
notes and amenable to specific definition. In losing its
identity in the new entity, moreover, each does not fully
disappear but remains theoretically identifiable.
-Bayne,
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 243 (1969).
As "theoretically identifiable," each will henceforth serve as the
foundation for successive sections of the Brief. For now, consider
only the second coconstituent: The Illicit Consideration, which lies at
the heart of the third section of the law of this Brief applicable to
the facts.
(3) The Disgorgement
[Any bonus received for such transfer of their office [must]
be returned to the corporation.
-In re Lionel Corp., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1964, at 14, col.
4 (S. Ct.).
"[T]he law will impress a trust in favor of the corporation
upon the property, interests and profits so acquired."
-Schildberg Rock Products Co. v. Brooks, 258 Iowa
759, 768, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137 (1966) (quoting Guth v.
Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (1939)).
Le Mars is entitled to reimbursement for the ... premium
...
which we have fixed in the amount of $307,500.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
662 (Iowa 1979).
Once the reasoning has progressed thus far, the law of the land
has been unanimous: Disgorgement of the proven premium-bribe over
to the injured entity. The collected cases, the commentators, cold
logic, have all concluded that the unearned recompense, the $6.8
million in premium-bribe, belongs in law and justice to Statesman.
The Illicit Consideration
Although the total tort has a triple turpitude, only the
specific turpitude of the illicit [consideration] is referable to
the [$6.8 million]. Here is the sole rationale of the disposition.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-ControlPremium: The Disposition,
57 Cal. L. Rev. 615, 637 (1969).
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Now the importance of the triple breakdown of the turpitude is
manifest. The perversion of the contr6leur's judgment, the appointment of a premium-briber successor, both have later applicability.
But for now, the unearned dollars are "the all-important emolument
of the transaction."
Here, standing isolated, is one element common to the
premium-bribe, unearned recompense, without the perversion of the officer's judgment or any question of an unsuitable successor. The malefaction is a clear case of illicit
emolument, without more. The chief executive officer ...
accepted [$6.8 million] in compensation for corporate acts,
performed pursuant to a corporate program, in fulfillment
of a corporate duty, in the course of official business,
during the regular workweek, for which he was already
amply remunerated.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 235 (1969).
Cold logic mandates, therefore, that the $6.8 million in unjust recompense be disgorged to Statesman. This is the only tenable disposition of the premium-bribe dollars.
Recall, moreover, that the strictures of Strict Trust were not
alone in issuing this mandate of disgorgement:
Completely apart from custody and the loyalty strictures of a trustee, no employee from contr6leur to janitor
can licitly be paid twice for doing his job. The turpitude
consequent on the breach of the simple contractual quid
pro quo is generally characterized as dishonesty, or in less
refined circles as plain old stealing.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 237 (1969).
Commutative justice issues a much more earthy mandate: Return
stolen property.
The Law of Restitution
Thus a principal is entitled to a bribe received by his agent
from a third person, although the principal's profit from
the transaction, aside from the bribe, was the same as it
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would have been if no bribe had been given [see Restatement
of Agency §403].
-Restatement of Restitution § 128 comment f, 531 (1937).

Predictably, the labors of the Restatement reduced this reasoning
to succinct pronouncements. The Restatements of Trusts, Agency,
Restitution, all have similar mandates.
The most sophisticated and exacting rationale is the deft
blending of restitution with trust, and the conjunction in
turn of this blend with the basic tort action [of PremiumBribery]. The law of restitution has a long and reliable
history and complements admirably the benefit-to-beneficiary rule of trusts:
Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the
beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or com mission or
other profit, he holds what he receives upon a constructive
trust for the beneficiary. [Restatement of Restitution, § 197
(1937).]
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 615, 638, 639 (1969).
The Comment to the Restatement singled out Messrs. Roth and Noble:
Bribes and Commissions. The rule stated in this Section
is applicable not only where the fiduciary receives something
in the nature of a bribe given him by a third person in order
to induce him to violate his duties as a fiduciary, but also
where something is given to him and received by him in
good faith, if it was received for an act done by him in
connection with the performance of his duties as a fiduciary.
-Restatement of Restitution § 197 comment a (1937).
With Noble and Roth, the matter was a fortiori, since certainly 'good
faith' never entered the machinations. To the contrary, calloused
months of competitive Premium-Bribery characterized the Noble/
Roth conspiracy:
The Collected Cases
I am also of opinion that [the Directors] are trustees for
the plaintiff and the shareholders [of the London Mutual]
on whose behalf he sues. There is a clear admission that
571f, 8s. 7d. has been paid [for the Sale of Control].
-Gaskell v. Chambers, 122 Rev. Rep. 138, 140 (Ch.
1858).
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Again predictably, neither cold logic nor the commentators of
the Restatements are divorced from the long line of judicial and
legislative pronouncements beginning in the earliest England and
reaching to the American 1980s. An exhaustive litany of cases would
be a vulgar exhibition. Pertinent samples over the years and from
various jurisdictions should buttress the logic and the Restatements:
[Tihe trustee derived the profit . . . from the [sale of the]
office itself. I shall therefore direct that the £75 be repaid
by Horsfield and dealt with as a part of the assets [of the
trust].
-Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620, 621 (V.C.
1856).
The election of directors and the transfer of the management
and property of the corporation were official acts, and
whatever money he received from such official acts were
moneys derived by virtue of his office for which we think
he should account [to the Life Union Mutual].
-McClure v. Law, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (N.Y. 1899).
[Tihe moneys or other secret profit which Marshall received
by selling out his trust, belonged, "not to him, but to the
insurance company," ....
-Heineman v. Marshall, 92 S.W. 1131, 1134 (St. L.
Ct. App., Mo. 1905).
If the succession was worth $125,000 in the market, the sale
(if it were lawful) should have been made by the directors
for the benefit of the owners of the [Mutual Life], not of
So the
Gray. For Gray had nothing legally saleable ....
trust.
of
betrayal
a
was
...
arrangement
-Moulton v. Field, 179 F. 673, 675 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 219 U.S. 589 (1910).
[His official position is not his individual property [to be
dealt with as he pleases, and to be sold for such a price as
[A]ll money thus made
he may be able to get for it] ....
in common to its
belongs either to the corporation, or .
shareholders ....
-Porter v. Healy, 91 A. 428, 432 (Pa. 1914).
The subject of the negotiations was . .. transferring . ..
[T]he National Life Insurone company to the other ....
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ance Company, through its officers . . . entered into a secret
arrangement . . . to appropriate the benefits of the transfer
to their own advantage, to the exclusion of the other
shareholders [of Des Moines Life].
-Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362,
391, 157 N.W. 929, 938 (1916).
A secret profit realized by a director from an undertaking to deliver the corporate control of his company inures
to the corporation. Fletcher, Cyclopedia, "Corporations,"
vol. 4, §2321; 2 Thompson on Corporations, §1237 [citations].
-Keely v. Black, 107 A. 825, 827 (N.J. Ch. 1919)
[rev'd, 91 N.J. Eq. 520, 111 A. 22 (1920)].
[I]t indisputably was a condition of the sale that all the
officers and directors then in office should forthwith resign
and . . . elect an entirely new directorate chosen wholly by
the purchaser of the stock ....
[Tihese officers and directors must account to the
corporation . . . for the sum ....
-Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 651, 659 (Sup.
Ct. 1941).
Hence to the extent that the price received by Feldmann
and his codefendants included such a bonus [for the Sale
of Control], he is accountable to the minority stockholders
-Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
The rationale of the rule is undisputable; persons enjoying
management control hold it on behalf of the corporation's
stockholders, and therefore may not regard it as their own
personal property to dispose of as they wish.
-Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575
(2d Cir. 1962).
[Alny bonus received for such transfer of their office [must]
be returned to the corporation.
-In re Lionel Corp., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1964, at 14,
col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
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Even ratification by the beneficiaries would not save a
fiduciary from accountability for any amounts realized in
dictating or influencing the choice of a successor unless this
was secured with notice that the beneficiaries were entitled
to the profit if they wished ....
-Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1343 (2d Cir.
1971).
The sole appropriate remedy is a declaration that the
consideration paid to the trustees by Lytton Financial Corporation allocable to a transfer of control of the Association
is an asset held for its benefit in the hands of the trustees.
-Beverly Hills Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v. Federal Home
L. Bk. Bd., 371 F. Supp. 306, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
The theory is not that all the shareholders are entitled to
share in the bribe but rather that one who sells an asset
[control] he does not own must turn over the proceeds to
the true owner. The true owner is the corporation. The
malefactor, according to Rosenfeld, is the selling shareholder. He owes that part of the proceeds which is the
premium to the corporation that owned the asset. As in the
case of corporate opportunity, the opportunity diverted
must be recompensed to the corporation, not to its shareholders.
-Gordon v. FundamentalInvestors, Inc., 362 F. Supp.
41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Where the president and director of a corporation was paid
money by outside parties upon the condition that he procure
their election as directors of the corporation with powers of
control and management, such money was received by virtue
of his office and from official acts and he must account to
the corporation for it.
-Brecher v. Gregg, 392 N.Y.S.2d 776, 780 (N.Y. Sup.

Ct. 1975) (quoting 12 N.Y.
724 (1960)).

JUR. CORPORATIONS

§§ 717,

It is these amounts which were paid or diverted from LeMars
Mutual by reason of the illegal agreement, and such amounts
are returnable to Le Mars Mutual in full.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., Equity No. 22725,
slip op. at 21 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Plymouth County, Oct.
3, 1977).
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This is the amount for which Le Mars must be reimbursed. Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d at 1350; Moulton v.
Field, 179 F. 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1910); Gordon v. Fundamental In vestors, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d at 178; Porter v. Healy,
244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428, 431 (1914); McClure v. Law, 55
N.E. at 389.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
659 (Iowa 1979).
(In this one excellent summary, the Supreme Court of Iowa incorporated into its sale-of-control philosophy some 80 years of sound
reasoning, highlighted in Rosenfeld v. Black, Moulton v. Field,
Gorden v. FundamentalInvestors, Inc., Perlman v. Feldmann, Porter
v. Healy, McClure v. Law, all quoted above.)
Yet further support for disgorgement over to Statesman of the
$6.8-million will be found in the tort/crime analysis.
Commercial Bribery
The criminal interdiction of modern state codes confirms the
public-policy abhorrence of the sale of office, expressed as early as
1388 (if not earlier) with the statute of 12 Richard II, ch. 2, and
reiterated in 1551 in 5 Edward VI, ch. 16. The present-day statutes
add nothing new, but simply restate a truism: Premium-Bribery is
inherently corrupt:
Bribery: Every person who shall . . . give to any officer,
agent or trustee ... any money ... with intent to influence
his . . . judgment . . . shall, on conviction, be imprisoned
in the penitentiary not more than ten years, or fined not
more than one thousand dollars, or both.
-Miss. Code Ann. § 97-11-11 (1972).
Commercial Bribery: A person is guilty of commercial
bribing when he ... agrees to confer, any benefit upon any
...fiduciary ... to influence his conduct.
-N.Y. Penal Law § 180.00 (McKinney 1963).
Commercial Bribery: It is unlawful for a [prospective contr6leur] to offer . .. for the personal benefit of a [contr6leur] acting on behalf of his [corporation] in a business
transaction . . . with the [prospective contr6leur] a gratuity
in consideration of an act ... in conflict with the ... duties
of the [contr6leur] to the [corporation].

SALE-OF-CONTROL
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[Likewise re the premium-bribed.]
-Iowa Code § 722.10(2) (1983) (narrowed to this context).
And so in Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, etc., etc. The punishment
for the crime of Commercial Bribery varies from state to state, but
the rationale is the same everywhere. Every criminal code, moreover,
condemns both briber and bribed equally.
The transition from crime to tort is perfunctory, and part of the
common law of every jurisdiction. The crime-derived tort may be per
se, prima facie or inferential, but acknowledged tort it is. (Hall v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1977).)
III. Embezzlement
Often, however, the new appointee [Noble] avoids the circuity of a personal payment and later corporate recoupment
by an immediate raid on the [Statesman] corporate till.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 502 (1969).
Thus [Statesman], not [Noble], would really be paying [the
premium-bribe].
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
656 (Iowa 1979).
The Roth/Noble Premium-Bribery and the Noble Embezzlement
are two totally distinct malefactions, yet in the Statesman Story the
facts have so intertwined them as to require special concentration to
extricate the one from the other. Yet each is a separate malefaction
and each malefaction has its own appropriate sanctions. Only by a
childlike attention to the factual context can one isolate the Embezzlement from the Premium-Bribery. This isolation can best be effected
by a close analysis successively of (1) The Outline of the PremiumBribery, and (2) The Proof of the Embezzlement Confirmed.
(1)

The Outline of the Premium-Bribery

[T]he evidence confirms the trial court's finding that Iowa
Mutual paid a [substantial] sum ... as a premium in return
for Mr. Alesch's delivery of control of the board of directors
of Le Mars Mutual.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
659 (Iowa 1979).
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Le Mars is entitled to reimbursement for the . . . premium
...which we have fixed in the amount of $307,500.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
662 (Iowa 1979).
An exact reliance on Le Mars yields two benefits, and both are
important, the one essential, the other gratifyingly helpful. Le Mars
is not only an all-fours legal precedent for Statesman-strictly Le
Mars controls without more-but Le Mars is also the perfect embarkation point toward the isolation of the Premium-Bribery from the
Embezzlement. Understand the Premium-Bribery/Looting in Le Mars,
and the Premium-Bribery/Embezzlement in Statesman is simplicity
itself.
From the Premium-Bribery aspect alone-in contradistinction to
the Embezzlement-of Le Mars and hence of Statesman, two distinct
legal stages stand out: (1) The passing of the $300,000 premium-bribe
from Iowa Mutual to John Alesch for the transfer of control of Le
Mars from Alesch to Iowa Mutual, and (2) The Court-ordered disgorgement of the $300,000 to Le Mars from John Alesch.
In the first of these two stages, the Le Mars Court relied on the
five essentials of Premium-Bribery: (1) The payment of a $300,000
premium-bribe, (2) To John Alesch the incumbent contr6leur of Le
Mars, (3) By Iowa Mutual the would-be contr6leur, (4) To induce the
appointment to the office of control, (5) With scienter.

$300,000 In the second of the two stages the Le Mars Court ordered John
Alesch, for breach of his fiduciary duty to Le Mars, to disgorge the
entire $300,000 premium-bribe to Le Mars, the injured company.
Why? Because Mr. Alesch was performing a corporate act, on corporate time, as part of his job-he was appointing his successor-for
which he was already being paid-he was receiving a substantial

SALE-OF-CONTROL PREMIUM-BRIBE

1988:9]

salary-by Le Mars. Any double pay belonged to Le Mars. This was
no windfall. Simply Le Mars dollars disgorged to Le Mars.
And the clear result of this, of course, was that Iowa Mutual,
the guilty premium-briber, thereby forfeited its $300,000, forever. (At
the same time, of course, Iowa Mutual was ousted from control of
Le Mars.)
LE MARS MUTUAL
Office of
IOWA
MUTUAL

Contrbleur

JOHN

ALE SCH

Again limited only to Premium-Bribery, Statesman tracked Le
Mars exactly: (1) A $6.8-million premium-bribe passed (2) To the
incumbent contr61eur Roth (3) From the would-be contr6leur Noble
(4) To induce the appointment to the office of control (5) Made
knowingly. Again all five Le Mars requisites.

$6,800,000---

Comes now a major point of emphasis: The Court in Statesman,
pursuant to Le Mars, must order Edward W. Roth, for the breach of
his fiduciary duty to Statesman, to disgorge the entire $6.8-million
premium-bribe to Statesman, the injured company. Why? Because no
employer, be he janitor or contr6leur, is paid twice for doing his
work. (Or take a DuPont chemist. Any new products, discovered on
company time, during the regular company work, for which the
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chemist is fully paid, inure to the benefit of his company.) Thus this
was no windfall. Simply Statesman dollars that belong to Statesman.
Again, as in Le Mars, the patent consequence: David J. Noble,
the guilty premium-briber, will thereby forfeit his entire $6.8 million.

Forevermore. (And, of course, David J. Noble must be ousted from
control.)
STATESMAN GROUP

Contr leur
NOBLEROTH

This brief summary has isolated completely Premium-Bribery
from Embezzlement. The all-important legal fact in this summation:
The Disgorgement of the $6.8-million premium-bribe is the application
of the law of Strict Trust-as applied in the context of The Illegal
Sale of Control-to a premium-briber, Roth, the former contr6leur
of Statesman. More important, this Disgorgement has absolutely
nothing to do with the source of the dollars, or Mr. Noble's responsibility for those dollars. Noble, as did Iowa Mutual, has lost his $6.8
million. Forevermore.
Moreover, this Disgorgement of the $6.8 million has only an
accidental connection at most with the second, distinct malefaction,
Embezzlement.
(2)

The Proof of the Embezzlement Confirmed
Although definitely begging a later question, nearly every
successful premium-bribe is sooner or later recouped from
the corporation [Statesman].
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 502 (1969).
Often, however, the new appointee [Noble] avoids the circuity of a personal payment and later recoupment by an
immediate raid on the [Statesman] corporate till.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 502 (1969).
Again the parallel with Le Mars persists. Now, however, a
variation-albeit only an inconsequential one-injects itself into the
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parallel. In both cases, true, Looting was the ultimate source of the
premium-bribe dollars passing to Roth and Alesch, incumbent contr6leurs. The only difference lay in the timing. Noble looted immediately.
Iowa Mutual looted later.
In Le Mars, when Iowa Mutual determined to premium-bribe
John Alesch, it followed the normal pattern of Premium-Bribery,
reached into its own pocket, took out its own premium-bribe dollars,
and handed them over to John Alesch. The result: The premiumbribe dollars were in John Alesch's hands irrevocably, and poor old
Iowa Mutual never saw them again.
Faced with this grim reality, the out-of-pocket Iowa Mutual, now
settled into control of Le Mars, conceived a plan that would recoup
the very dollars that it had lost forevermore. The only rub? The entire
looting plan was reduced to writing for all, including the Court, to
read:
The most damaging single bit of evidence . . . is the hotly
disputed "recoupment" letter ....
Thus Le Mars, not Iowa Mutual, would really be
...
paying [the premium-bribe].
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
656 (Iowa 1979).
At this point in the Le Mars drama two things stand out: First, Iowa
Mutual lost its $300,000 premium-bribe, forevermore. But, second,
for the moment at least, the entire $300,000 has been 'recouped' by
Iowa Mutual, by the simple expedient of looting Le Mars. "Thus Le
Mars, not Iowa Mutual, would really be paying [the premium-bribe]."
But the "recoupment letter" had laid the matter bare. No collateral facts confused the Court. These recouped dollars had simply been
looted some two years later and stood out stark and clear. The
Supreme Court had no trouble in ordering Restitution. (Nor was there
any danger of confusing these Restitution dollars with the Disgorgement dollars that John Alesch was ordered to hand over to LeMars.
The two-year gap saw to that.)
The most damaging single bit of evidence . . . is the
[T]hat letter ...
hotly disputed "recoupment" letter ....
referred to the management contract under which Le Mars
was to pay . . . $2,500.00 per month (later one per cent of
Le Mars' gross) as "management fees" as the means by
which Iowa Mutual would "recoup" [the premium-bribe
dollars].
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
656 (Iowa 1979).
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These "management fees"-and they were only one of several such
instances of looting-the Court ordered restored by Iowa Mutual to
Le Mars. (An obiter note: The looted dollars totalled far more than
the $300,000 premium-bribe, but for present purposes emphasize that
the Restitution included at least the original $300,000. This it was
that caused the Court to say: "Thus Le Mars, not Iowa Mutual,
would really be paying for the [premium-bribe dollars].")

LE MARS
MUTUAL

IOWA

MUTUALMUTUAL

LE MARS
MUTUAL

IOWA

The Noble Recoupment-in-Advance
Although definitely begging a later question, nearly
every successful premium-bribe is sooner or later recouped
from the corporation [Statesman]. Often, however, the new
appointee [Noble] avoids the circuity of a personal payment
and later recoupment by an immediate raid on the [Statesman] corporate till.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 502 (1969).
In essence David J. Noble faced exactly the same problem at the
outset of his plot as Iowa Mutual faced in its determination to
premium-bribe John Alesch. Both Noble and Iowa Mutual needed
premium-bribe dollars with which to do the deed. And in the end,
both Noble and Iowa Mutual chose the same solution in their quest
for premium-bribe dollars. Both looted the target companies, Statesman and Le Mars. But each took a different route to the same goal.
Iowa Mutual employed a two-step approach to the PremiumBribery. First, it used its own premium-bribe dollars and then, some
months after the takeover, recouped those dollars by looting the Le
Mars till. David J. Noble, however, driven by the exigencies of his
situation-Roth's impatience, his poverty-reduced the two steps to
one, and avoided "the circuity of a personal payment and later
recoupment by an immediate raid on the [Statesman] corporate till."
In the end, Noble reasoned, much could be gained by this Recoup-
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ment-in-Advance. The immediate use of embezzled dollars might even
obfuscate the situation sufficiently to confuse the shareholder owners
and even, God forbid, the Court, into thinking nothing had been
stolen. (Or that Roth had restored the embezzled $6.8 million rather
than disgorged the premium-bribe.)
The parallel of the Noble Recoupment-in-Advance with the Iowa
Mutual later Recoupment demands parallel sanctions. Mr. Noble is
as fully responsible to Statesman for the looted $6.8 million as Iowa
Mutual was to Le Mars for the looted $300,000.
The Statesman Looting
STATESMAN
GROUP

D.J.
INOBLE

The Statesman Restitution
STATESMAN
GROUP
-$6,

$800, 000--

D.J.
NOBLE
800,000-~

The Legal Implications
Thus Le Mars, not Iowa Mutual, would really be paying
[the premium-bribe].
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
656 (Iowa 1979).
Perhaps some hilltop reflections could put the Noble Restitution
in proper perspective. A few useful hypotheticals might well highlight
the reality of the Noble Embezzlement that warrants the Noble
Restitution.
The Burgled Bank: Suppose Mr. Noble had in fact followed the
expectable counsel of a Willie Sutton. A nocturnal visit to a neighborhood bank would have netted Mr. Noble the necessary $6.8 million
demanded by Edward W. Roth. (This approach to the looting would
also both obviate the unpleasantness of looting Statesman-after all,
Noble would not even know the bankers, and, more to the point,
they would not know him-and also preclude any discovery down the
road by irate Statesman shareholders.)
To continue the hypothetical, had Mr. Noble been caught, as
bank robbers are wont to be, the result would need no divination to
predict. Irrespective Qf prison term, the bank would of course immediately sue for Restitution of the $6.8 million. The result would be
equally predictable: Full restitution by Mr. Noble to the bank.
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The obvious question: Should Statesman fare less well than the
burgled bank?
STATESMAN
GROUP

STATESMADN
GROUP

D.J. NOBLE

One? or 4,800? View the matter yet another way. As between
Mr. Noble and the looted shareholder owners of Statesman, who is
on the high ground? Are the owners of Statesman any the less looted,
any the less out of pocket, because they are many rather than one?
Were Mr. Noble to have embezzled the $6.8 million from, say,
nine ten-percent owners, would those nine hear Noble say that he did
not owe Restitution? As between a proven looter and equally proven
innocent victims, who is to prevail?
Premium-Bribery at GUG: Add another valid hypothetical. Suppose Mr. Noble had long coveted control of his old company, General
United Group. But, true to form, he had no money, and GUG's
contr6leur, Jack Schroeder, demanded $6.8 million. Whence the $6.8
million? Statesman's till, of course. (Noble was not 'inside' GUG.)
The looting of Statesman is done. Control of GUG passes. Noble is
ensconced in GUG. Schroeder has his premium-bribe dollars. Now
what?
Caught in the act, Schroeder is ordered by the Court to disgorge
the $6.8 million over to the injured GUG, for Premium-Bribery. But
now what of Noble, and Statesman's looted dollars?
Clearly Mr. Noble would argue-as he now argues-that (1) He,
Noble, no longer has the $6.8 million, which is true, and (2) Mr.
Schroeder has already disgorged the dollars to GUG, which is true,
and (3) Hence, Noble would conclude, Statesman has no complaint.
Statesman's dollars are already repaid. To GUG, of course. Which,
of course, is not true. Statesman would readily recover the dollars
looted by Noble. Simply because the injured GUG recovered premiumbribe dollars has absolutely nothing to do with Statesman's right to
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recover Noble-embezzled dollars. Baldly put: Two malefactions and
two sets of dollars are involved.
Therefore, if Statesman may recover in the hypothetical, why not
Statesman in the reality of the present? Did not Statesman in the
present lose the $6.8 million as painfully as the hypothetical Statesman? The Statesman treasury is equally bereft.
Or could one argue that GUG had no right to the premium-bribe
$6.8 million? And that Statesman somehow had a claim to the
premium-bribe dollars Schroeder disgorged to GUG? Is there only
one wrong? Clearly, in the hypothetical-and in the Statesman Story
in the present-two wrongs, Premium-Bribery and Embezzlement,
marched hand in hand.
A Fail-Safe Blueprint: Consider further the legal consequences
were Statesman denied the Restitution of its looted dollars. Envisage
the precedent for Iowa, and for later looters who forgo the circuity
of the Iowa Mutual two-step, and opt for Recoupment-in-Advance.
What message would the Court send to all such future sale-of-control
premium-bribers?
What incipient premium-briber would be such a fool as to use
his own premium-bribe dollars? Here, indeed, would be a Courtinspired fail-safe blueprint. Consider the delicious alternatives for
such a premium-briber. If he is undetected, all would be well and not
a dollar lost. If, however, he was caught in the act, still no matter.
The premium-bribed-an.Edward W. Roth-would be forced to
disgorge, and the premium-briber-a David J. Noble-would be
unscathed. All would be well and not a dollar lost. No need for
Restitution. Or, as the Le Mars Court commented with such deep
insight: "Thus Le Mars, not [premium-briber] Iowa Mutual, would
really be paying [the premium-bribe dollars]'." Premium-bribed John
Alesch-and premium-bribed Edward W. Roth-would be the only
losers. Such a holding would indeed reward Recoupment-in-Advance.
Such a premium-briber would have absolutely nothing to lose. (Iowa
Mutual was a bungler.)
'Loot immediately and avoid detection.' The thought would be
irresistible. Later looting is too visible, too open to scrutiny. But
simultaneous looting gets lost in the maze of facts around the Premium-Bribery itself. Somehow, such a Looter-in-Advance would reason, a court cannot see two separate malefactions, two sums: (1) The
$6.8 million Mr. Roth must disgorge for Sale-of-Control PremiumBribery and (2) The $6.8 million Mr. Noble must restore, because of
old-fashioned Embezzlement.
Carry these legal reflections yet one step further. How would
Iowa Mutual, today, recalling that it had been held to a $300,000
Restitution, react to the news that Mr. Noble, by the simple variant
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of Recoupment-in-Advance, had gotten off scot free? Would not an
immediate Rehearing be the only equitable course? Should Iowa
Mutual be penalized for using its own premium-bribe dollars? While
David J. Noble is rewarded for prudently using Statesman's money?
On the other hand, when the Court does order Restitution, then
Noble and Iowa Mutual are treated equally. And the precedent of Le
Mars is preserved:
The Premium-Bribery
Disgorgement
JOHN
ALESCH

~

The Looting Restitution

IW
MUOUAL

LE MARS
MUTUAL

GROUP

- $6,800,000-.

L

+

IV.

-T$6,800,000

-

i

The Remedy

We are aware that our conclusions may result in very serious
consequences to defendants, notwithstanding their freedom
from evil motives. To sustain, however, their dealings with
the company would be subversive of elementary principles
governing fiduciary relationships in general and the management of corporations in particular, and would open the
door to the grossest frauds, by corporate managers.
-Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 221-22, 214 N.W. 718,
725 (1927).
The Remedy is sixfold: (1) Disgorgement, (2) Restitution, (3)
Joint and Several Liability, (4) Punitive Damages, (5) The Ouster of
the Board, and (6) The Court-SupervisedElection.
(1) Disgorgement
Their conduct was deliberately designed to wrongfully obtain control of Le Mars. ..
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.. Le Mars is entitled to reimbursement for the . . .
premium . . . in the amount of $307,500.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
662 (Iowa 1979).
Edward W. Roth, as contr6leur of Statesman, received a $6.8million premium-bribe to induce him to hand over control of Statesman to David J. Noble. This act of Sale-of-Control Premium-Bribery,
reprobated by Le Mars as against public policy, was a breach of Mr.
Roth's fiduciary duty to Statesman and violated the age-old principles
of Strict Trust laid out over the decades by the Iowa courts.
The legal consequences of Sale-of-Control Premium-Bribery have
been universally accepted:
Thus a principal is entitled to a bribe received by his agent
from a third person, although the principal's profit from
the transaction, aside from the bribe, was the same as it
would have been if no bribe had been given [see Restatement
of Agency, §403].
-Restatement of Restitution, § 128 comment f (1937).
Edward W. Roth remains to this day in possession of this illicit $6.8
million. His is patently the primary liability.
(2)

Restitution

Often, however, the new appointee [Noble] avoids the circuity of a personal payment and later recoupment by an
immediate raid on the [Statesman] corporate till.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition,
53 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 502 (1969).
Had David J. Noble used his own dollars to premium-bribe Mr.
Roth, he would now simply be out of pocket that $6.8 million,
forevermore. Had Mr. Noble borrowed the $6.8 million, he would
now be indebted to his creditor for those $6.8 million. Had he stolen
the $6.8 million, he would be liable for the full amount, and undoubtedly be in jail as well. But Mr. Noble decided to steal the $6.8 million
directly from Statesman and then pay it over to Mr. Roth as a
premium-bribe. As with the burgled bank, so now with Statesman.
David J. Noble is liable for Restitution in the amount of $6.8 million.
No recondite law is needed to mandate this restoration of Statesman
to its position before the Premium-Bribery. And irrespective of the
Premium-Bribery.
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(A Contrary-to-Fact Interjection: Bear forcefully in mind
throughout: Had Mr. Roth (1) refused the $6.8 million, and (2) had
he forced Mr. Noble to return the dollars to the till before any deed
was done, two results would have ensued: (1) Roth would not have
been culpable, would not have been premium-bribed, and would not
be liable for the $6.8-million Disgorgement, and (2) Noble would not
have been culpable (except in desire), would not have been an embezzler, and would not be liable for the $6.8-million Restitution. But
none of these did occur. Roth was in fact guilty of consummated
Premium-Bribery, and Noble of consummated Embezzlement. Hence
both Roth and Noble are subject to the full sanctions of the respective
malefactions, which they irrevocably and irreversibly committed. And
the respective sanctions are equally irrevocable and irreversible.)

(3) Joint and Several Liability
We have already pointed out [that] all who assist or
cooperate in the breach of fiduciary duties-whether directors or not-are liable for the resulting damage.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
654 (Iowa 1979).
Every Defendant, from beginning to end, was on notice that
David J. Noble was passing a substantial premium-bribe to Edward
W. Roth to buy control of Statesman. Every Defendant was equally
on notice that David J. Noble was looting Statesman in order to
obtain the $6.8 million with which to bribe Roth.
In the first place Le Mars is the real complaining party, the
one victimized by the wrong. It had a right to expect its
directors to be more vigilant in protecting it. . . . [T]hese
men were faced with questionable conduct directly affecting
their own corporation. There were circumstao!ces which
should have clearly signalled a duty to inquire and investigate.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
653-54 (Iowa 1979).
The rule has long been indisputably clear: Directors and their abettors
are subject to joint and several liability for every act integral to any
conspiracy. As Bechtel put it:
Conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence
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and may be inferred from concert of action, declarations
and conduct.
-Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel
& Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 1082, 51 N.W.2d 174, 217
(1952).
Bechtel added several cases in support. The law has never been
controverted:
It is axiomatic that directors and officers of a corporation are jointly as well as severally liable for mismanagement, willful neglect or misconduct of corporate affairs if
they jointly participate in the breach of fiduciary duty or
approve of, acquiesce in, or conceal a breach by a fellow
officer or director. [Citations.]
-Seaboard Indus., Inc., v. Monaco, 276 A.2d 305,
309 (Pa. 1971).
Thus the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. So, too, the corporate-wise
Second Circuit in 1973 in Schein:
Indeed, the general rule has always been that "one who
knowingly participates in or joins in an enterprise whereby
a violation of a fiduciary obligation is effected is liable
jointly and severally with the recreant fiduciary." [Citations.]
-Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973).
In the recent 1976 Gould the Third Circuit reiterated the rule:
Where two or more persons fail to perform a common duty
each is liable for the entire harm resulting from the breach.
Restatement of Torts §878 (1939). As joint tortfeasors they
are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs' entire
damage which they have inflicted. Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 132 (1912);
Prosser, Law of Torts, 314-315 (4th ed. 1971). ...
-Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535
F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976).
Joint and several liability is patent. The Le Mars Court repeatedly
held all parties jointly and severally liable.
Although Roth is primarily liable for the Disgorgement of the
$6.8 million to Statesman, David J. Noble was equally liable. (After
all, he was the premium-briber, even though he no longer has the
money.) And the remaining five members of the board, O'Neill,
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Ashton, Conyers, Clendenen and Casady, joined in the conspiracy
and certainly would be described as aiders and abettors.
Although David J. Noble embezzled the $6.8 million from Statesman, and hence is primarily liable for its Restitution, Edward W.
Roth was nonetheless a member of the board, and he and the other
five would also be jointly and severally liable for their part in the
conspiracy, and would undoubtedly be aiders and abettors.
Corroboration of this directoral liability lies also in a damning
fact: To this day none of the seven has mounted a Director's Derivative Suit-much as this Shareholder's Derivative Suit-to vindicate
Statesman's rights against the malefactors.
Liability Without Sharing
One who knowingly and intentionally participates in effecting a fraud is liable even though he did not share in the
fruits of the wrongdoing.
-Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel
& Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 1082, 51 N.W.2d 174, 217 (1952).
The gravamen is the infliction of injury, not a share of the spoils.
Thus, (1) David J. Noble, the premium-briber, is equally responsible
with Edward W. Roth, the premium-bribed, for the Disgorgement
over to the injured Statesman of the premium-bribed dollars. So also
is the board of directors, for its full participation. Thus also (2) the
board of Statesman is equally liable-Mr. Roth included-with Mr.
Noble for the Restitution of the dollars looted from Statesman. In
neither of these depredations did any of the Defendants-except, of
course, the primary malefactors, Roth and Noble-pocket any dollars
personally. Or so at least it seems.
Casey points out that he received no part of the premium received by the favored defendants . . . and he contends that it was error to hold him liable to the Plaintiffs
for their share of the premium ....
This is, however, not
an action for an accounting for premium received but rather
a suit to recover the damages suffered by the plaintiffs as
the result of the defendants' wrongful acts. The fact that
the plaintiffs' damages may be measured by a proportion
of the premium received by the favored defendants does not
make the judgment recovered any the less an award to
compensate the plaintiffs for the loss which they suffered
from the wrongful conduct of Casey and any other defendants who may be found liable.
-Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535
F.2d 761, 778 (3rd Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
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With this background the Third Circuit in the 1976 Gould went on in
specific answer to the present Damages question:
Where two or more persons fail to perform a common duty
each is liable for the entire harm resulting from the breach.
Restatement of Torts § 878 (1939). As joint tortfeasors they
are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs' entire
damage which they have inflicted. [Citations], and this is
true even though one of the tortfeasors held liable has
received no benefit from his wrongdoing. [Citations.] It
follows that Casey is liable in damages, both severally and
jointly with any other defendants held liable, for the loss
suffered by the plaintiffs.
-Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535
F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976).
Thus all Defendants face joint and several liability irrespective of
a share in the Premium-Bribery, or the Embezzlement.
(4)

Punitive Damages

[T]his court has repeatedly sanctioned allowance of exemplary damages, where appropriate, by way of punishment
to the actor and as a deterrent to others.
-Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 620
(Iowa 1978).
Little controversy surrounds the question of Exemplary Damages.
Every requisite is verified in the case of the seven Statesman Defendants.
The judicial thinking on- Punitive Damages has coalesced in the
now-famous 1974 Holi-Rest:
In Holden, supra, 202 N.W.2d at 359 we said:
[I]n a stockholder's derivative action an equity court may,
in its discretion, award exemplary damages upon a showing
that some legally protected right has been invaded, such as
an intentional act of fraud or other wrongful conduct. ...
[A]n intentional act of fraud in a court of equity includes
all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach
of either legal or equitable duties, trust or confidence, justly
reposed, which are injurious to another or by which an
undue or unconscionable advantage is taken.
See also Charles v. Epperson & Company ....
-Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517, 525-26
(Iowa 1974).
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The facts of the Statesman Story spread over these pages go far
beyond the demands of Holi-Rest, Holden and Epperson. Further
dilation would be offensive.
One comment, however, should be particularly cogent. Even a
cursory reading of the concise facts in Holi-Rest will immediately
convince that "Treloar's flagrantly wrongful acts" were child's play
compared to the protracted, deliberate and calloused machinations of
Roth, Noble and the other five directors.
Treloar's flagrantly wrongful acts, omissions and concealments have been injurious to the corporation and its
stockholders. Without question, his self-dealing has caused
the corporation losses not only in the sums above specified
but in undetermined amounts which under this record cannot be ascertained. We hold Holi-Rest is entitled to exemplary damages from Treloar in the amount of $25,000.
-Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517, 526
(Iowa 1974).
Note further that the 1974 Holi-Rest, for acts best described as
innocent compared to the double depredation against Statesman,
exacted Punitive Damages against a single officer in an amount in
excess of 25 percent of the Compensatory Damages. This modern
application of Exemplary Damages should be a minimum in the case
of Statesman.
The Rationale
In the same vein it is understood the allowance of smart
money rests with the fact finder ....
More to the point,
this court has repeatedly sanctioned allowance of exemplary
damages, where appropriate, by way of punishment to the
actor and as a deterrent to others.
-Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 620
(Iowa 1978).
The fourfold purpose of Exemplary Damages is aimed directly
at each Defendant in this case, from Messrs. Roth and Noble, the
principal malefactors, on down to the remaining five members of the
board. Punitive Damages are awarded as: (1) "[A] punishment for
the particular party involved." (2) "[A] warning and example ... to
all others who may offend in like manner." (3) "[A] salutary protection to society and the public in general." (4) "[A]dding to the
complaintant's award." (Sebastian v. Wood, 66 N.W.2d 841, 844
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(Iowa 1954).) The imposition of Exemplary Damages on every single
Defendant will justly achieve each of these four objectives.
Consonant with Holi-Rest, Holden and Epperson, and the admonition in Hoyt, the Court must now consider closely the pertinent
elements constituting the norm for Punitive Damages-the culpability,
sophistication, wealth, malice, intent-and award damages appropriate in amount. One further adversion could aid the Court.
A Smart to the Wealthy
[An intentional act of fraud [for Punitive Damages purposes] in a court of equity includes all acts, omissions and
concealments which involve a breach of either legal or
equitable duties, trust or confidence, justly reposed, which
are injurious to another or by which an undue or unconscionable advantage is taken.
-Holden v. Construction Machinery Co., 202 N.W.2d
348, 359 (Iowa 1972).
The objective in Punitive Damages must be a weighing of (1)
ability to pay and (2) culpability. A certain percentage of one's Net
Worth recognizes the ability to pay. The amount of the percentage
recogizes the culpability. Thus the more guilty should pay a higher
percentage, but all should pay a percentage, not an unrelated fixed
amount.
(5)

The Ouster of the Board

In strict practicality, the crucial distinction for future
sale-of-control litigation lies in the built-in nature of the
premium-bribe-induced unsuitability. No true premium-bribe
under any conditions whatsoever can be passed without
engendering the triple blemish of the perversion, the illicit
consideration, and the resultant unsuitability. To the extent,
therefore, that an appointee is prepared to twist the judgment and divert the corporate dollars, thus far is he already
an unsuitable custodian. As thus unsuitable he caps it off
by imposing a premium-briber [himself] on the firm. Whatever further deficiencies he may possess do not affect this
ever-present built-in disability.
-Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215, 243 (1969).
David J. Noble is a calculating premium-briber. "Whatever
further deficiencies he may possess do not affect this ever-present
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built-in disability." Never will David J. Noble successfuly gainsay this
blemish of Premium-Bribery. In this Premium-Bribery, the five incumbent directors were willing aiders and abettors.
But Mr. Noble does possess a prominent 'further deficiency,'
over and above the Premium-Bribery. A further major malefaction,
the Embezzlement of $6.8 million, was deliberate, consciously excogitated, over several weeks. This deliberate Looting was further forceful
proof of Successor Unsuitability. Again, to this malefaction the five
board members were willing participants. Under no conditions could
the Court continue to entrust Statesman to such malefactors. The
only question remains: How assure the total removal of David J.
Noble and the five participant board members?
(6)

The Court-Supervised Election

ORDERED that this Court shall appoint a new interim
independent board of directors for Equity Funding Corporation of America.
-SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,917 (C.D. Cal. 1973)
Federal Judge Charles E. Stewart Jr. Friday signed a consent
order providing for court appointment of a new board of
directors ....
-International Controls Reaches an Accord with SEC;
Court Will Appoint a New Board, Wall St. J., March
19, 1973, at 10, col. 1.
We affirm that part of the decree . .. providing for the
appointment of interim directors until the election of directors under supervision of the trial court.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639,
657 (Iowa 1979).
The all-encompassing powers of the Equity Court-so vividly
implemented by Holi-Rest and Le Mars-mandate a Court-fashioned
remedy to meet the peculiar exigencies surrounding Statesman. Here
is an insistent need for a watchful Court in prosecuting the entrustment
of Statesman to a wholly new and honorable group of directors.
Indefinite retention of jurisdiction is a necessary concomitant of a
Court-supervised election. Holden stated the underlying philosophy:
"Wherever a situation exists which is contrary to the
principles of equity and which can be redressed within the
scope of judicial action, a court of equity will devise a
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remedy to meet the situation, though no similar relief has
been given before." [Citations.]
-Holden v. ConstructionMachinery Co., 202 N.W.2d
348, 363-64 (Iowa 1972).
Examples after examples, especially in recent days, have stumbled one
over the other in which courts have ousted malefactors and then,
toward future protection, devised foolproof machinery to guarantee
a brand new, impartial board. Among the most recent and appropriate
are Phillips and Le Mars. (Since Le Mars is still in the process of
implementation, it can aid only partially.)
Phillips Petroleum
The conduct of the individual defendants constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, theft and looting.
-Notice to Stockholders of Phillips Petroleum Company, U.S.D.C., C.D. Cal., Civ. No. 76-611-EAC, Feb.
18, 1976 (published in Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1976, at 13,
col. 1).
As with Equity Funding, Le Mars and Statesman, the Federal
Court was faced with an essentially corrupt board. As did the Court
in both Equity Funding and Le Mars, Federal Judge Curtis in Phillips
handled the turnover of control in two stages. First the Phillips Court
personally named six nationally known persons (among them Harold
Williams, recently Chairman of the SEC) to fill the vacuum created
by the ousted malefactors. (To the present day, the Court-appointed
board in Le Mars continues to manage the company.)
After this preliminary stage, the Court provided surety for the
future:
The newly elected Board of Directors shall at its first
meeting appoint a Nominating Committee, consisting of at
least three members and composed entirely of independent
outside directors, which shall have sole authority to recommend to the Board of Directors the nominees to be
presented to the voting security holders.
-Notice to Stockholders of Phillips Petroleum Company, U.S.D.C., C.D. Cal., Civ. No. 75-611-EAC,
Feb. 18, 1976 (published in Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1976,
at 13, col. 2).
With this the Court closed its Order with a sage precedent for
Statesman: A two-year retention of jurisdiction:
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Phillips may, after March 31, 1978, petition the Court
for an order terminating jurisdiction, and the Court may,
pursuant to such petition, make such an order if it finds
that Phillips has fully complied with the Final Judgment.
-Notice to Stockholders of Phillips Petroleum Company, U.S.D.C., C.D. Cal., Civ. No. 75-611-EAC,
Feb. 18, 1976 (published in Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1976
at 13, col. 3).
Minor differences with Statesman cannot blunt the efficacy of Phillips
as an approach consonant with Holden: "[A] Court of Equity will
devise a remedy to meet the situation." [Holden v. Constr. Machinery
Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 363-64 (Iowa 1972)].
The District Court in Le Mars did 'devise a remedy,' which would
seem to meet the needs of Statesman exactly:
As soon as practicable, the Court shall also order and
supervise the election of a new Board of Directors for Le
Mars Mutual. Interim directors shall be elibigle to succeed
themselves. The successor board shall not be elected until
the interim board has had full opportunity to assess the
present status of Le Mars Mutual, consult with the Iowa
Insurance Commissioner, retain competent management for
the company, and establish and implement a plan for the
careful separation of Le Mars Mutural and Iowa Mutual.
-Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co., Equity No. 22725,
slip op. at 24 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Plymouth County, Oct.
3, 1977).
Conclusion
We are aware that our conclusions may result in very serious
consequences to defendants, notwithstanding their freedom
from evil motives. To sustain, however, their dealings with
the company would be subversive of elementary principles
governing fiduciary relationships in general and the management of corporations in particular, and would open the
door to the grossest frauds, by corporate managers.
-Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 106, 221-22, 214 N.W.
718, 725 (1927).

